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One mechanism for addressing the problems of a lack of institutional capacity is that of public-public 
partnerships (PUPs), whereby established public sector operators are used to assist the development of local 
managerial, financial, and accountability capacity. Drawing on empirical evidence on two PUPs between 
Stockholm‟s municipally-owned water company and its counterparts in Kaunas, Lithuania and Riga, Latvia 
and extrapolating from the available literature, this paper looks at the differences between the dynamics of 
PPPs and PUPs and at the developmental potential of PUPs.   
 
The dynamics of PUPs are radically different from those of PPPs, in terms of the underlying objectives and 
motivations, the basis of the partnership and the configuration of accountability networks, risk management, 
promotion and implementation of institutional change and in terms of knowledge transfer and capacity 
building. Institutional and organisational change associated with PPPs is systematically informed by the 
private operator‟s commercial objectives, which represents an element of rigidity and potential conflict as 
profit-seeking might and often does diverge from developmental objectives. The antagonistic character of 
PPPs and the “shock therapy” approach of related policies have encountered widespread social and political 
opposition on an international scale. Conversely, as a result of their not-for-profit basis and retainment of 
public ownership and management of operations, PUPs rely on a more gradual and collaborative approach to 
change which can facilitate socio-political acceptability and local commitment.     
 
The developmental potential of PUPs depends on the establishment of clear objectives, in light of the 
political mandate, with the collaboration being stimulated by mutual trust and understanding and public 
sector ethos. Unfettered by any conflict of interest inherent to public water operations, the principal-agent 
relationship between the PUP‟s political and financial sponsors and the partners can be strengthened by 
introducing transparency and accountability requirements in terms of reporting. Discipline in the 
implementation phase can be further instilled through planning and the thorough structuring of the project. 
PUPs are intrinsically about capacity building and training, thanks to their advanced ability to transfer 
knowledge treated as a public good rather than as a private, marketable asset. However, their cost-
effectiveness and long-term developmental impact can be enhanced by incorporating investment and in-
house restructuring programmes into partnership design. The inclusion of civil society and community 
representatives among the partners might favour the success of PUPs as local commitment is facilitated and 
capacity is developed for local governance, with highly interconnected accountability networks acting as 
catalysts for knowledge transfer and reinforcing the ability to take decisions and actions. Bilateral donors and 
IFIs should consider supporting PUPs as a viable conduct for inducing sustainable water sector reform 
provided their focus is on promoting context relevant “good governance” principles rather than changes in 
the ownership of public operations which have proved counterproductive in the past. Indeed, the 
effectiveness of PUPs is to be promoted by fostering their public-ness and enhancing their distinctive 
characteristics rather than relying on mechanisms, such as the competitive selection of partners and 
mimicking of commercial contracts, which risk to prejudice the dynamics on which the success of PUPs 
rests.     
 
Keywords 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs); Public-Public Partnerships (PUPs); Public Sector; Capacity Building; 
Institutional Development; Governance; Contracts; Twinning Arrangements; Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs); Training; Knowledge Transfer; International Financial Institutions (IFIs); Investment 
Finance; Competition; Trust; Human Resources Development; Public Sector Ethos   
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Introduction 
In the last 15 to 20 years, the international debate on the reform of the urban water supply and sanitation 
sector has primarily revolved around the privatisation of operations through Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) or Private Sector Participation (PSP). As considerable resources have been devoted to PPPs as the 
favourite option of International Financial Institutions (IFIs), bilateral donors and Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs), alternative approaches to the reform of water services have been long overlooked. The reform of 
public water operators through in-house restructuring and partnerships preserving public ownership and 
control and the public-ness informing operations feature predominantly among such alternatives. Empirical 
evidence increasingly point to the developmental potential of this new generation of partnerships, often 
identified as Public-Public Partnerships (PUPs) (Hall et al., 2005; Hall & Lobina, 2003; Hall, 2000; Miranda, 
2006; Reclaiming Public Water, 2006; Hall et al., 2002; Davis, 2004; Lobina & Hall, forthcoming in 
Development Studies).  
 
This papers looks at the experience with a limited number of PUPs, aiming at drawing lessons on the factors 
conducive to the success of such partnerships in enhancing governance structures and build local capacity, as 
well as the practicalities associated with their implementation. It does so by drawing on empirical evidence 
on two PUPs established between Stockholm‟s municipally-owned water company Stockholm Vatten and its 
counterparts in Kaunas, Lithuania and Riga, Latvia and extrapolating findings from the available literature 
on PPPs, PUPs and public sector reform. Findings obtained from the in-depth analysis of the experience with 
a specific type of PUP in a given geographical context are related to the empirical observations contained in 
literature in order to elicit adjustments and strengthen their generality.   
 
A first section provides an overview of the problems associated with the introduction of PPPs in transition 
and developing countries and the failure of the policy relying on PSP as a driver for sectoral reform at a 
global level, in order to establish the rationale for the analysis of PUPs and their promotion. The reviewed 
literature allows for the systematisation of competing and concurrent arguments aiming at explaining the 
failure of PPPs to deliver the expected benefits in urban water supply and sanitation. In turn, this provides 
the basis for the development of an analytical framework for the identification of the essential characteristics 
of PPPs. The same framework can be applied to other partnerships such as PUPs, for a comparative 
evaluation of the differences in the underlying dynamics and implications for sectoral reform.  
 
A second section briefly illustrates the concept of PUP and the various types of partnership which have been 
developed in practice. This is followed by a detailed account of Stockholm Vatten‟s experience with PUPs in 
the two Baltic countries, set on the background of the international initiative which spurred reform and 
capacity building efforts in the region. The emerging findings are discussed in relation to fundamental 
aspects of the observed partnerships: objectives and motivation; relationship between partners and 
accountability networks; risk management, transaction costs and cost-effectiveness; knowledge transfer, 
capacity building and training; institutional and organisational change and the role of donors and IFIs. 
Although the analysed partnerships consist of two twinning arrangements between public water operators, 
the literature on PUPs and in-house restructuring is sufficiently extended to allow for formulating 
considerations on strengthening of local capacity and governance through community involvement.  
 
Furthermore, observations and recommendations relevant to the promotion and scaling up of PUPs as a 
vehicle for reform are put forward with particular reference to the proposed global mechanism being 
developed by the UN Secretary General‟s Advisory Board (UNSGAB). These pertain to the mobilisation of 
political willingness to support PUPs internationally, the analysis of actor behaviour leading to local 
initiatives culminating in PUPs, the contribution of adequate resources to the adopted PUPs, overcoming the 
limited capacity of Northern public operators by promoting South-South and domestic partnerships, and the 
elaboration of strategies aimed at locally retaining knowledge transferred and the developed capacity. 
Finally, conclusions address the differences in terms of dynamics between PPPs and PUPs, the potential 
developmental impact of PUPs, and areas for further policy relevant research. 
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The experience with PPPs of the last 15 years in developing countries: theory and 
practice 
For the purpose of this essay, we constrain our analysis of PPPs to those partnerships envisaging the transfer 
of managerial control over water supply and sanitation operations to a private operator, usually a MNC. Such 
arrangements range from management contracts, to lease (also known as “affermage”) and concession 
contracts, to full divestiture. Although the largest majority of urban water operations around the world 
remains under public management (up to 90% globally), heavy promotion of PPPs in the last 15 years has 
meant that there has been a relatively considerable increase in PSP, particularly so in the largest cities which 
are commercially more attractive (Lobina & Hall, forthcoming in Progress in Development Studies).  
 
The international water community came to see PPPs as the solution to the problems of the water sector in 
light of dissatisfaction with the performance of public utilities, particularly in transition and developing 
countries. As summarised by Braadbaart (2001: 5), “By 1990 the developing country water industry was 
ready for a radically new solution to its management problems. That year marked the end of the Water 
Supply and Sanitation Decade, a ten-year effort to achieve universal coverage in developing countries 
(World Health Organization 1992). The Decade effort failed to reach this target but impressed on water 
industry professionals the seriousness of service delivery problems and the fact that no amount of capital 
investment seemed able to solve them”. Roth (1987: 230-231, 263) attributed poor performance in quantity 
and quality of water operations in developing countries to poor management of the public sector, and urged 
the introduction of PSP as a faster solution to the magnitude of the global water crisis: “Management in the 
public sector can often be improved, but the involvement of the private sector can bring quicker results, and 
the dimensions of the various problems cry for quick results”. Franceys (1997: 6) refers to the limited results 
of public sector reforms as part of the rationale for resorting to PPPs: “Capacity building in the urban utilities 
has been attempted with institutional development programmes which have proved their worth during the 
lifetime of a project (or a particular leader) but have generally not achieved the break-through into self-
sustaining growth”. 
 
There is a broad literature on the purported benefits of PPPs in the water sector, which can be summarised as 
the following three arguments: a) private sector‟s greater efficiency and flexible, proactive management 
leading to enhanced service levels and improved operational capacity; b) private sector‟s financial capacity, 
leading to increased access to investment finance; c) fiscal benefits for local governments as their budgets 
are relieved from the burden of investment finance (Hall & Lobina, forthcoming in Geoforum; Hall & 
Lobina, 2006: 9-10). As a matter of fact, the reality of PPPs has in many cases fallen short from such high 
expectations in the last 15 years. The percentage of private operating contracts undergoing problems ranging 
from termination to widespread opposition to private operators‟ pricing and operational policies is 
alarmingly high, at an estimated 44% for the cities of more than one million inhabitants (Lobina & Hall, 
forthcoming in Progress in Development Studies). Furthermore, the number of new household connections to 
the pipeline network realised with private finance in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (excluding 
China) has been dismal (Hall & Lobina, 2006: 37-39). This negative outcome has been compounded by a 
decrease in the financial contribution of multilateral and bilateral development agencies to developing 
countries‟ infrastructure due to overoptimistic expectations on private investment financing (Hall & Lobina, 
2006: 48-50). Faced with disappointing results, the World Bank and other organisations which have been 
promoting PPPs in infrastructure and water have recently acknowledged the limitations of the private sector 
(Lobina, 2005: 82; Miranda, 2006).            
 
A number of competing and concurring arguments might contribute to explain the failure of PPPs to deliver 
the expected benefits in urban water supply and sanitation. 
 
High transaction costs 
This argument refers to the transaction costs associated with the introduction of PPPs in the water sector as a 
determinant of costs transferred to consumers in the form of tariffs and taxpayers in the form of 
governmental expenditure. Such transaction costs correspond to the legal, consulting and financial costs of 
structuring an infrastructure project and include the identification, allocation and mitigation of the 
performance and political risks involved for the private operator and its shareholders, as well as the project 
financiers. These costs are high and can amount to 10% of the total costs of a project, as the future 
profitability of the project depends on successful risk management. Other transaction costs might relate to 
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the introduction of a regulatory agency, whose structure will have to be supported by consumers through 
tariffs or the government, or the competitive selection of the private operator. Even relatively high 
transaction costs might not provide guarantees that they will achieve their intended goal (Lobina & Hall, 
2003: 22).      
 
Contract failure 
This argument posits that contracts are inadequate to regulate complex relationships such as the principal-
agent relationship between local authorities and private water operators, due to the impossibility of 
foreseeing all the variables that might affect the implementation of contractual obligations under PPPs, 
particularly so in developing countries. As summarised by Braadbaart (2001: 16), “The contract instrument 
simply cannot cope with the combined challenge of a long time horizon, high uncertainty, difficult to define 
service and problematic environment. What results are soft targets, squishy outputs, and endless 
negotiations”.  
 
Dynamic interest seeking 
This approach identifies the dynamic interest-seeking behaviour of private operators as the cause of 
discrepancy between the theory and practice of water privatisation. MNCs would rely on their superior 
resources in terms of information, but also technical expertise and legal resources and political clout in 
respect of host governments and other stakeholders to pursue their commercial considerations. “The most 
important factor driving outcomes appears to be continual profit-seeking and risk-avoiding behaviour of 
international water companies, in interaction with local and national governments (pursuing mixed political 
and fiscal goals), political and community movements, and international donors and institutions pursuing 
their own goals. The results of this process are strongly affected by the unequal distribution of resources and 
skills between the parties and by the limited competition in this sector. It is these dynamics, we argue, which 
explain the actual (mis)allocation of risk, the (in)effectiveness of governance, and the content (and constant 
revision) of the contracts themselves, as well as the actual outcomes in terms of investment finance, 
extension of systems (or failure to extend), pricing policies, and transparency” (Lobina & Hall, 2003: 3-4). 
This inconsistency would be observable on pricing levels, the delivery of expected investment programmes 
and general implementation of contracts, including the delivery of services to the poor (Lobina & Hall, 2003: 
9-33; Hall & Lobina, forthcoming in Geoforum). A corollary of this argument is that the international private 
sector is characterised by a limited risk taking capacity which explains MNCs‟ withdrawal from developing 
countries in the face of currency risk or other unforeseen occurrences. It is this intrinsic aversion to risk 
which would make it unsuitable to address the long term needs of developing countries in relation to water 
services (Hall & Lobina, 2004: 271-272). 
 
Another corollary, and one more relevant to capacity building and local governance, is that water MNCs 
would tend to retain their knowledge at managerial level in that its transfer to local actors would undermine 
the very raison d‟être of PSP. They would instead transfer more limited technical and operational knowledge 
to local staff, local community members and other stakeholders should that prove instrumental to the 
enhancement of the PPP‟s profitability (Lobina & Hall, forthcoming in Progress in Development Studies; 
Hall & Lobina, forthcoming in Geoforum). This would contribute to explain why meaningful and effective 
public participation or community involvement in decision making on and monitoring of PSP appears to be 
extremely uncommon (Lobina & Hall, 2003: 20-21). 
 
Socio-political legitimacy and popular resistance to PPPs 
This argument postulates that, contrary to the public sector, the private sector and particularly so the 
international private sector do not enjoy the socio-political legitimacy which is a precondition for the 
acceptation of reforms by local communities across developing countries. “Both critics and supporters of 
privatisation have noted the importance of political resistance to privatisation as a negative factor making the 
economic viability of private operators more risky” and thus undermining the viability of PPPs (Hall, Lobina 
and de la Motte, 2005; Lobina & Hall, forthcoming in Progress in Development Studies).   
 
In light of the above, we offer the following analytical framework to identify the essential features of PPPs, 
although this can be applied to other types of partnerships so that competing approaches to the reform of 
urban water systems and their implications can be compared. The characteristics of the partnership are 
qualified from the perspective of the external or supporting partner, so that in the case of PPPs their 
description is based on the private operator‟s approach to the partnership.  
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Table 1. Partnership features of PPPs in transition and developing countries (from the perspective of 
the supporting partner) 
Feature of partnership Description 
Primary objective Profit maximisation, in light of mandate from shareholders 
Main incentive - Short term: market penetration 
- Medium to long term: exploitation of captive market and contribution to mother company‟s growth  
Relationship with local 
partner 
Principal-agent relationship between local authorities/decision makers and the private operator 
Institutional change - Reform of institutional framework is required before the beginning of PPP (e.g. with introduction of 
regulatory agency, reform of pricing structure) 
- Organisational change of local undertaking to be carried out by private operator, in line with 
commercial imperatives 
- Institutional reforms introduced reflect established “models” of PPPs (e.g. French, UK “models”) or 
hybrid (e.g. French “model” with regulation; see Foster, 2005) 
- Shock therapy approach, possibly towards local decision makers (e.g. in case of conditionality on 
privatisation), more often towards local workforce and community as profitability depends on pace of 
internal reorganisation (e.g. layoffs) and move towards full cost recovery (e.g. tariff increases) 
- Meaningful community involvement and public participation are severely limited by private 
operator‟s control over operations and commercial imperatives of the partnership    
Risk management Risk to be allocated to party better placed to mitigate it, usually performance risk to be allocated to 
private operator and political risk to local authorities, depending on type of PPP. The exception is 
with management contracts, whereby performance risk rests with the public operator 
Capacity building and 
knowledge transfer 
- Local managerial capacity is not built as public management is replaced by private management, 
loyal to private shareholders not local authorities 
- Local workforce retrained and reoriented to pursue commercial objectives (Hall & Lobina, 
forthcoming in Geoforum) 
- Local community trained and involved in service delivery if that proves instrumental to commercial 
viability of contract (Hall & Lobina, forthcoming in Geoforum)  
- Knowledge as a private good means that knowledge is transferred selectively to stakeholders, if that 
proves instrumental to own commercial objectives (Lobina & Hall, forthcoming in Progress in 
Development Studies) 
Accountability Accountability to own shareholders and financiers, more than local authorities. Relationship with 
local authorities is of antagonistic nature. Conflict resolution is based on conventional (e.g. resort to 
arbitration) or unconventional (e.g. suspension of concession fees payment) sanctions if expected 
profitability is threatened (Lobina & Hall, 2003: 13-16) 
 
Public-Public Partnerships (PUPs): A typology and definitions 
A review of existing literature shows that there is no single consistent use of the concept of „Public–Public 
Partnerships‟ (PUPs). It appears to have originated as a response to the concept of „Public–Private 
Partnerships‟ (PPPs), and its meaning also depends on the context in which it is used. Despite these 
uncertainties, PUPs can conveniently be classified according to the different types of partners involved; and 
the objectives of the PUPs. The narrowest definition of the concept of „Public–Public Partnerships‟ (PUPs) is 
the one most commonly used in North America and Europe, which refers to any collaboration between two 
or more public authorities in the same country. This collaboration may occur between public authorities of 
the same type and level (usually inter-municipal consortia) or it may occur between different types or levels 
of public authorities, for example between provincial and local authorities. However, this narrow use of the 
concept of PUPs has been broadened to include partnerships between public authorities (government) and 
any part or member of the general public. For example, a recent definition of PUPs in South Africa includes 
„„government–community partnerships, government–NGO partnerships, as well as government–government 
partnerships” (Kitchen, 2003), in other words, partnerships with NGOs, community organisations and trade 
unions. In addition, there are partnerships with an international dimension: „development partnerships‟, 
which partner a public authority from a high-income country with a public authority in a low-income 
country, and cross-border partnerships between authorities from different countries, including international 
associations of public authorities (Hall et al., 2005: 5).  
 
For the purpose of this paper, we look at a specific category of PUPs consisting of not-for-profit 
arrangements whereby a public sector water authority or company in one country helps a public sector water 
authority in another country to build capacity, e.g. by consultancy, training, management services, financial 
redesign or joint programmes of investment etc. Such links are sometimes part of “twinning” arrangements 
between local authorities in different countries (Hall, 2000: 3). The number of such type of PUPs is certainly 
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high, although to date no definitive survey has been carried out, and it encompasses a wide variety of 
supporting and supported partners in various regions. Despite some mixed past experiences with twinning 
arrangements in the water sector (Miranda, 2006: 57; Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 5), the experiences 
reviewed in different regional contexts varying from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to Africa and Asia, 
suggest that the developmental potential of PUPs is high (Hall, 2000; Hall & Lobina, 2003) but that remains 
largely untapped.  
 
Stockholm Vatten’s experience with PUPs in the Baltic region 
The experience of Stockholm‟s municipally-owned water supply and sanitation company Stockholm Vatten 
as a supporting partner in the Baltic area is of particular interest in light of the institutional and operational 
issues addressed throughout the 1990s‟ in collaboration with the local partners in Kaunas, Lithuania and 
Riga, Latvia, the substantial investment programmes realised and the long term positive impact generated in 
terms of capacity building. The identification of Baltic Sea pollution as a problem shared by Nordic and 
Baltic countries prompted an international initiative, the HELCOM Commission, aimed at finding solutions 
through cooperation. Internationally coordinated efforts attracted the human and financial resources required 
to address underinvestment in and poor quality of water supply and sanitation services in countries 
undergoing transition from communist regimes. Furthermore, financial support offered by a number of 
international agencies and bilateral donors shows that PUPs might represent vehicles for tapping investment 
finance. Both PUPs have enjoyed important financial support from the EBRD, while a number of other PUPs 
in the region saw the World Bank as main financier. 
 
The HELCOM commission as the enabling international context 
The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) is an international body set up to improve the Baltic Sea environment 
and operates a Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Programme (JCP). This “provides an 
environmental management framework for sustained cooperation among the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention, other governments within the region, international financial institutions, and nongovernmental 
organisations for the long-term restoration of the ecological balance of the Baltic Sea, through a series of 
preventive and curative actions to be undertaken in a phased manner in the region.”.  1 
 
The JCP has worked partly through identifying pollution „hotspots‟ in the Baltic basin, and directing 
financial and technical resources to solve the problems in those and other places, especially in water and 
wastewater systems. The result has been an international programme of capacity-building and investment 
throughout the basin: “Programme activities to support strengthening of water and wastewater utilities have 
focused on rehabilitation, upgrading and/or expansion of infrastructure in municipalities in the countries in 
transition… Representative projects include: Haapsalu, Pärnu, Tallinn and Tartu in Estonia; Daugavpils, 
Liepaja and Riga in Latvia; Kaunas, Klaipeda, Siauliai and Vilnius in Lithuania; and Gdansk, Gdynia-
Debogorze, Torun and other cities in Poland. Project preparation is being undertaken in Kaliningrad and 
implementation of selected activities has started in St. Petersburg in the Russian Federation. …. In addition, 
in the Russian Federation, a national water and wastewater programme that will address issues in 15-20 
cities throughout the country is being developed. Mechanisms have also been established and funded for 
interventions to support medium and small municipal systems in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) supported Small Municipalities Environment 
Project in Estonia provides an example of a project to address a number of smaller cities.” 
 
International funding in the form of loans, soft loans, grants and other types of assistance has been important 
in accelerating the rate of JCP implementation in the countries in transition. The programme has found that 
there is great effectiveness in “cofinancing that blends loans from IFIs and grants from the European Union 
and bilateral donors” – this helps make investments more affordable for countries in transition; reduced 
project preparation and supervision costs; the size of the projects can be larger, allowing greater impacts and 
reducing the effective cost; and the use of grants “also reduces the impact of adjustments to tariffs for 
services to project beneficiaries, thus decreasing potential adverse impacts on populations with low or fixed 
incomes” (Hall, 2000: 8). 
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Stockholm Vatten’s approach to PUPs in Kaunas, Lithuania and Riga, Latvia  
Stockholm Vatten‟s PUPs have been typically linked to specific investment programmes with technical 
assistance and capacity building taking place in order to support the concurrent institutional reform of the 
local water operators, change of their operational practices and investment implementation. The schemes 
provided for the partial recovery of Stockholm Vatten‟s costs and did not contemplate the possibility of 
making profits out of the PUPs. 
 
The costs of Stockholm Vatten‟s human resources devoted to the twinning were covered by the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), while the investment programme carried out by the 
local water operators with the assistance of Stockholm Vatten received funding from the EBRD, EIB ad 
other multilateral and bilateral agencies and was co-financed by the host governments and supported 
partners. The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) supporting the PUPs also defined the objectives of the 
twinnings, which generally included the achievement of environmental goals through enhancing the quality 
of water services and the operators‟ restructuring. More precisely, Stockholm Vatten‟s support was aimed at 
enhancing “financial performance through improved management, operational efficiency, full cost recovery 
and institutional development, transforming the local twinning partner into an autonomous, self-financing 
and self-governing company without municipal or governmental subsidies in the future” (Bjerggaard, 2006: 
3).  
 
In both Kaunas and Riga, Stockholm Vatten provided technical assistance to the local partners (respectively, 
Kaunas Water Company and Riga Water) by providing a limited number of resident advisers, who were 
responsible for know-how transfer in a number of technical and operational areas and for providing support 
to the in-house restructuring of the two undertakings. The main resident adviser was also responsible for 
coordinating visits by short-term experts to meet with their professional counterparts in the host organisation 
and arranging short term visits of personnel from the host organisation to Stockholm Vatten‟s headquarters. 
Knowledge transfer has taken place from the managerial level to rank-and-file positions and has also 
interested local decision makers. It has been conveyed through on-the-job training and other means including 
workshops, personal contacts and demonstrations, visits, etc. Exchanges and knowledge transfer has 
continued after the end of the twinning agreement, although more sporadically. Stockholm Vatten‟s approach 
also provided for the “establishment of professional networks and cooperation forums between the water 
companies in the area and their foreign twinning partners” (Bjerggaard, 2006: 2).    
 
The twinning arrangements were divided into two phases, with the first one lasting no more than one year 
devoted to preparation for the various components: institutional reform, operational change, investment 
projects (as regards access to investment finance). This implied the development of a number of preliminary 
studies and documents and the delivery of training sessions aimed at key persons. Project Implementation 
Units (PIUs) which were to take responsibility for procurement and project management, were established 
and trained in this phase (Bjerggaard, 2006: 3, 11).       
 
The second phase focussed on implementation of the established programme during a period of four to five 
years. It included the development of a comprehensive Corporate Development Programme, from the 
identification of corporate strategy to long term planning, and provision of support to organisational changes 
and human resource development, as well as financial, operational and environmental performance, with the 
introduction of Nordic and European standards. Investment implementation took place in parallel to 
institutional and organisational changes. Finally, a “Public Information Programme aimed at customers, end-
consumers, owners, and other stakeholders was established in order to improve the general image of the 
twinning partner and his operations. The strategy was to highlight the environmental engagement, the 
important investment project attracting foreign financing and the relatively low tariff for the existing 
services” (Bjerggaard, 2006: 2, 3-8).    
 
 “The water companies in Kaunas and Riga stand today as successful role models for twinning arrangements 
between public water entities, where goals were met timely and within budget. The companies are now 
implementing their second major investment projects without twinning assistance and the financiers are very 
satisfied with the enhanced and sustainable capacity of these companies” (Bjerggaard, 2006: 2, 8). 
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Stockholm Vatten’s PUP in Kaunas, Lithuania 
Cooperation between Nordic and Baltic capital cities started in 1992 and, “upon request of EBRD and with 
the support of Sida” a twinning arrangement between Stockholm Vatten and Kauno Vandenys started in 
1994. However, it should be noted that Stockholm Vatten had already established contact with the Baltic 
utilities as early as 1989. Kaunas (population of 430,000) had been identified by HELCOM as one of the five 
priority hot-spots in Lithuania since it was not endowed with a wastewater treatment plant and represented 
90% of the collected, untreated sewage in Lithuania. The Kaunas Water and Environment Project (KWEP) 
relied on a total investment budget of US$ 101 million, 80% of which was devoted to wastewater treatment 
and the remainder to water supply. Foreign grants accounted for 14% of total project costs, with Sida 
providing funding of SEK 16.4 million (US$ 2.27 million) to support both phases of the twinning 
arrangement (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 3-4). The investment programme was financed by the EBRD, 
NEFCO, EU/Phare, the Finnish and Swedish governments and was co-funded by local sources from Kaunas 
and Lithuania (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 1).  
 
KWEP was based on a feasibility study which, under the initiative of the EBRD and the Swedish technical 
assistance agency BITS, started in April 1993. Phase 1 of the twinning agreement aimed at preparing the 
investment project for financing and the changes to be introduced at institutional level. Phase 1 lasted from 
October 1994 to December 1995 and cost SEK 4.1 million. A priority Investment Programme, Procurement 
Plan, Implementation Schedule, Loan Agreements and State Guarantee Agreements were defined among 
other documents. In this phase, the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was also established (Lariola & 
Danielsson, 1998: 8). 
 
The Loan Agreements were made of loan covenants with the EBRD and NEFCO and, apart from specifying 
the terms of project execution, defined the reforms whose adoption was conditional upon the funding of the 
investment project. These included tariff increases, the establishment of a Financial Management 
Department operating under International Accounting Standards, the amount of internal funds to be 
reinvested in network rehabilitation each Fiscal Year, targets for the reduction of operational costs and a plan 
for reduction of bad debt. Conditions extended to reporting frequency and the content of the reports to be 
submitted. The Loan Agreements were accompanied by a Project Support Agreement with the city of 
Kaunas and a Guarantee Agreement with the Lithuanian government. The loan covenants shaped the content 
of the work programme to be carried out under the twinning arrangement and were described as representing 
a “de facto terms of reference for the twinning arrangement” (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 9-10). 
    
The institutional changes initially foreseen included the establishment of a joint venture between the local 
water operator Kauno Vandenys, NEFCO and Stockholm Vatten, but this was not possible due to local 
political opposition. Also, the rules governing the activity of both Sida and BITS prevented them from 
financing a joint venture. The institutional reform of Kauno Vandenys was thus limited to its transformation 
into a wholly publicly-owned PLC (Public Limited Company) (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 8). 
 
The four-year Phase II went from January 1996 to the end of 1999 and its budget totalled SEK 12.3 million. 
This phase saw the introduction of a new Company Board of 7 members, the adoption of a new 
organisational chart, a 20% reduction in staff from 1022 in December 1994 to 841 in March 1998 (Lariola & 
Danielsson, 1998: 21) and a Human Resources Development plan. Such changes took place in parallel to 
improvements in financial management, in the effectiveness of bill collection, administration and operations, 
as well as a comprehensive know-how transfer programme (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 9).  
 
Kauno Vandenys‟ Board was established following “much lobbying” by NEFCO, the EBRD and Stockholm 
Vatten on the merits of this solution. The Board was composed of 7 non-executive members, 3 of which 
representatives of the ruling political parties, 1 of the City Administration, 1 of the Kaunas Region, and 1 
each for the local energy utility and the university. There were also plans to extend political representation 
on the Board would be extended to the leading opposition party within the city council. Considerable 
twinning resources (i.e. Stockholm Vatten advisers‟ time) were devoted to persuading the municipal decision 
makers to implement project requirements and introduce the new tariff structure (Lariola & Danielsson, 
1998: 17).      
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Stockholm Vatten “delivered some 15 man years of assistance to the Kaunas twinning arrangements, 
including 80 man months for three resident long-term advisors and some 100 man months for 8 short-term 
experts” (Bjerggaard, 2006: 8). 
 
The partners‟ commitment and the unleashed knowledge transfer appear to lie at the core of the PUP‟s 
success. “Both (Stockholm Vatten) and (Kauno Vandenys) took the twinning agreement very seriously. … 
There has been an exchange of knowledge and experience on all levels – between the Boards, between the 
trade unions, the management teams and of course between all kinds of specialists” (Lariola & Danielsson, 
1998: 13). 
 
The consultants commissioned to review the twinning arrangement for Sida summarised the achievements of 
the PUP as follows: “(Kauno Vandenys) faced an enormous pressure to prepare and implement the biggest 
investment project of its history and, at the same time, transform profoundly its legal status, governance and 
organisation structure, management systems and practices, customer relations, financial management and 
information systems. It has succeeded amazingly well, largely due to (Stockholm Vatten) assistance” 
(Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 16).  
         
Stockholm Vatten’s PUP in Riga, Latvia 
With a population of 800,000, Riga is the largest city in Baltic countries and generates around 60% of 
Latvia‟s total municipal wastewater load (Lariola et al., 2000: i). Before 1991, all of Riga‟s wastewater 
underwent no type of treatment (Lariola et al., 2000: 24), while wastewater collected from Central Riga 
(with 200,000 inhabitants) was discharged untreated until the inception of the twinning. A recently 
constructed wastewater treatment plant was in need of major rehabilitation while 60% of the distribution 
network was reported to be in bad condition (Lariola et al., 2000: i).  
 
Stockholm Vatten started cooperating with Riga Water in 1992 and in 1994 the Riga Water and 
Environmental Programme (RWEP) was launched to improve water supply and sanitation services in Riga 
and the environment of the Daugava River and the Baltic Sea. Riga Water prepared a feasibility study for the 
investment project with assistance from Stockholm Vatten and the Swiss Federal Office of Foreign 
Economic Affairs (FOFEA). Riga Water “turned to” Stockholm Vatten and FOFEA for further assistance in 
preparing for the financing and implementation of the project and in September 1995 the three parties signed 
the agreement for Phase I of the twinning programme, which was financed by Sida and FOFEA (Lariola et 
al., 2000: 2-3). Phase I of the twinning lasted for 6 months from 1995 to 1996 and Stockholm Vatten assisted 
Riga Water in view of accessing international finance from the EBRD and EIB and grants from bilateral 
sources, as well as with the preparations for the implementation of RWEP (Lariola et al., 2000: 9). 
 
Phase II took place from November 1996 to December 2000 (Lariola et al., 2000: 9-10). The agreement 
between Riga Water and Stockholm Vatten identified the following objectives: a) the promotion of 
environmental sustainability and infrastructure development aimed at improving the environmental 
conditions of the Daugava river, the Gulf of Riga and the Baltic Sea by reducing the environmental impact of 
Riga‟s wastewater; b) improving the quality and reliability of water supply and wastewater services in Riga; 
c) “enhancing the financial performance through improved management, operational efficiency, cost 
recovery and institutional development transforming Riga Water into an autonomous, self-financing and self-
governing enterprise” (Lariola et al., 2000: 3). 
 
Like in the case of Stockholm Vatten‟s twinning with Kauno Vandenys, Phase II of the Riga twinning 
agreement was made up of an institutional development component and an investment implementation 
programme (Lariola et al., 2000: 9-10). The twinning agreement identified the scope of work, the frequency 
and content of reporting, administrative matters, the two partners‟ respective duties, the terms of reference 
for the PIU and a time chart for the implementation of the investment programme (Lariola et al., 2000: 9-10). 
Like in the case of Kaunas, the Loan Agreement between the EBRD and Riga Water shaped the content and 
implementation of the twinning programme, requiring a number of specific actions at institutional, 
managerial, financial and operational level contained in a Corporate Development Plan and specifying key 
financial indicators in terms of tariff increases, reserve account and debt service coverage (Lariola et al., 
2000: 11). 
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46% of the projected US$ 104.7 million investment programme was to be co-financed by the City of Riga 
and Riga Water, while the EBRD and EIB would together fund 39% and the remainder was to be provided 
by the governments of Latvia, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. Sida agreed to finance Phase II of the 
twinning agreement, the purchase of equipment for the rehabilitation of the biological treatment unit and the 
preparation of tender documents for the wastewater treatment plant, for a total SEK 37.1 million (Lariola et 
al., 2000: 3). Of this sum, SEK 20.3 million were devoted to the purchase of equipment for the wastewater 
treatment plant, while SEK 16.8 million (US$ 2.4 million) were allocated to Phase II of the twinning and the 
preparation of tender documents (Lariola et al., 2000: 9). The timely implementation of the investment 
programme, with the connection of the inhabitants of Central Riga to the wastewater treatment plant, resulted 
in a considerable environmental benefit for the whole region (Lariola et al., 2000: 27).       
 
As regards institutional and organisational changes, Stockholm Vatten‟s Water Utility Management Advisor 
actively participated in the process and influenced both Riga Water‟s top management and Riga‟s local 
authorities (Lariola et al., 2000: 17). Aiming at strengthening the water operator‟s autonomy from municipal 
authorities, changes within the governance framework of Riga Water included the introduction of a 
Supervisory Council although its activities remained under the close scrutiny of a municipal committee 
(Lariola et al., 2000: ii). Also, the EBRD required and obtained the establishment of a regulatory unit 
supervising Riga Water‟s tariffs and operations, acting as “an interface between the consumers and the 
utility” (Lariola et al., 2000: 17). 
 
As regards organisational changes, the installation and consolidation of the planning process was described 
by the consultants reviewing the twinning as “a major achievement” (Lariola et al., 2000: 19). “The (Riga 
Water) management and staff are now able to manage the planning process independently, with supervisory 
assistance from (Stockholm Vatten) only” (Lariola et al., 2000: ii). Stockholm Vatten‟s operational support 
to Riga Water‟s management was valuable (Lariola et al., 2000: ii, 21-23) and the established PIU proved 
“fully competent for handling the procurement of the investment projects. … PIU has gained much 
experience from (Stockholm Vatten), and is now able to act independently in most fields. Today, there is 
little need for support from (Stockholm Vatten)” (Lariola et al., 2000: 21-23). A customer database software 
was installed and efforts were made at improving the reliability of metering and meter reading and the 
effectiveness of bill collection (Lariola et al., 2000: 20-21).  
 
Importantly from the social point of view, Riga Water and Stockholm Vatten persuaded “the municipality to 
establish a social support facility for the families and individuals that cannot afford to pay for water. A visit 
to (Stockholm Vatten) inspired (Riga Water) financial staff to implement the change (Lariola et al., 2000: 
20-21).    
      
A staff reduction plan was devised to enhance efficiency, which projected a reduction in the workforce from 
1537 in 1998 to 1306 in 2003. However, the plan allowed for the recruitment of new staff due to the 
introduced technological innovations (for a total of 25-30 workers in late 1999) and cuts were not 
indiscriminate. A test had been carried out to evaluate whether services previously provided by the Transport 
and Workshop Department could be outsourced but this was rejected as in-house provision proved more 
efficient than resort to the market (Lariola et al., 2000: 20).    
 
All the twinning modules included training components and the transfer of know-how took place on a wide 
front. “Study tours to (Stockholm Vatten), and on-the-job training provided by (Stockholm Vatten) experts, 
have been the most useful form of training” (Lariola et al., 2000: 21). Stockholm Vatten “delivered some 9 
man years of assistance to the Riga twinning arrangements, including 75 man months for three resident long-
term advisors and 34 man months for 16 short-term experts” (Bjerggaard, 2006: 8). 
 
Overall assessment of the two PUPs 
Reviews and evaluations of these processes have been consistently enthusiastic, whatever their critical 
observations on specific aspects.  The SIDA review of its overall municipal twinning programme described it 
as “a successful experiment” ; the review of the Kaunas experience in 1998 described it as  “overwhelmingly 
positive” 2; the review of the Riga twinning set out a striking summary of  major technical, environmental, 
financial, managerial and governance achievements:  “SWC [Stockholm Water Company] has assisted RW 
[Riga Water] in the preparation and implementation of an investment programme (RWEP) for improving the 
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city‟s water supply and wastewater treatment.  The RWEP has promoted/will promote environmentally 
sustainable management and improved municipal infrastructure in the Baltic region.  The effluent load from 
Riga to Daugava River, and further to the Baltic Sea, has been essentially reduced.  As a direct result of the 
project, the quality and reliability of water supply and wastewater services has improved in Riga.  The 
twinning arrangement has essentially stimulated and supported the process of transforming RW into an 
autonomous, self-financing and self-governing enterprise.  There is a better understanding and appreciation 
on a political level of the requirements for arriving at an administratively and financially independent water 
company.  RW is very satisfied with the twinning arrangement and wishes to continue close cooperation with 
SWC beyond the current twinning agreement.  RW currently complies with all the covenants of the 
financiers.”3 (Hall & Lobina, 2003: 11-12). 
 
The main financier‟s satisfaction with the results of the two PUPs is demonstrated by the fact that, after the 
termination of the two twinning agreements, the EBRD agreed to issue loans to both Riga Water and Kaunas 
Water Company on a non-sovereign based. In November 2000, the EBRD decided to issue a EUR 39m loan 
to the municipally-owned Riga Water Company, which became the first Latvian utility to receive a direct 
corporate loan from an international financial institution. The loan was provided without any financial 
guarantee from the city council, in the light of Riga Water Company‟s ability to self-finance its operations. 
Instead, the loan was supported by a limited municipal undertaking, “including the city‟s adherence to 
agreed tariff schedules and other key obligations of the municipality towards the utility”4.   
 
Riga Water Company would use the loan to finance the construction of sludge deposits for its wastewater 
treatment plant, installation of water meters to consumers and extension of water supply and sewerage 
networks. Also, the loan would allow Riga Water Company to re-finance outstanding sovereign-guaranteed 
debts, which the company used to finance upgrading of its wastewater treatment plant and rehabilitation of 
the sewer network under a twinning arrangement with Stockholm‟s municipally-owned water company 
Stockholm Vatten. 
 
In July 2001, the EBRD decided to issue a EUR 14.7m loan to Kauno Vandenys (Kaunas Water Company) 
to help finance an ambitious EUR 41.3m investment programme. This was the first loan to a local utility in 
Lithuania to be provided without any sovereign or municipal financial guarantee and the EBRD expected it 
would “demonstrate to other cities and banks that it is possible to finance well-run municipal services 
without such guarantees”5.  
 
The project was designed to remove iron from the main water supply, support the rehabilitation and 
extension of the water pipeline system and finance secondary wastewater treatment facilities. The project, 
known as Phase Two as it followed another loan provided by the EBRD in 1995 to upgrade Kaunas water 
supply and sanitation, would be co-financed by Kauno Vandenys and the city council applied for funding 
from the EU‟s pre-accession instrument ISPA. In October 2001, the EU Commission approved a EUR 
15.96m ISPA grant to finance a water purification plant, which would allow to increase the degree of 
purification of the Nemunas river, the biggest river in Lithuania, from 70% to 95% as required by EU 
legislation. The total cost of the purification plant was estimated at EUR 28.2m, with Kauno Vandenys 
obtaining a EUR 9.57m EBRD loan and the Lithuanian government contributing EUR 6.38m6 (Lobina, 
2001: 15-16). 
 
Discussion of findings: PUPs as partnerships for capacity building and institutional 
development 
The analysis of Stockholm Vatten‟s experience with twinning arrangements in the Baltic region allows for 
drawing broader lessons on the factors conducive to the success and the positive developmental impact of 
this type of PUPs. 
 
Politics, public sector ethos and not-for-profit relationship at the heart of success 
The reviewed PUPs proved successful in building local capacity at various levels, from municipal decision 
makers to the local partner‟s management and staff, as well as facilitating institutional and organisational 
change. Firm reliance on public sector resources on both sides of the partnership, with its not-for-profit basis 
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functioning as a catalyst for effective interaction, have allowed to achieve the intended objectives in terms of 
public interest. In fact, the absence of commercial considerations in terms of profit-seeking has allowed for 
the concentration of resources on knowledge transfer aimed at capacity building and local governance, 
without deviations from the intended reform path.  
 
The process was initiated at the political level, first with an international initiative aimed at coordinating 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation, then with the political mandate instructing Stockholm Vatten to act as 
a supporting partner to its two Baltic counterparts (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 10, 15). Furthermore, it was 
the concerted municipal, national and international political initiatives that attracted international finance and 
bilateral grants so that the impact of the required investment projects could be more socially sustainable for 
the beneficiary communities (Hall et al., 2005: 33). Finally, public sector ethos acted as a vital source of 
motivation for the managers and staff who participated in the two PUPs for the supporting and supported 
partners. According to Lariola & Danielsson (1998: 13), Stockholm Vatten “takes great pride in its 
international assignments and in its possibility on a wider range to contribute to the improvements of the 
environment of the Baltic. The vision behind SWC‟s (Stockholm Vatten‟s) involvement in international 
projects is the firm belief that SWC (Stockholm Vatten) is successful in running an efficient waterworks and 
that its knowledge and experience can be transferred to other waterworks. This vision seems to be shared by 
most of the staff at SWC (Stockholm Vatten)” (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 13). The commitment and 
public sector ethos of Stockholm Vatten‟s staff is even more patent when considering that workers 
participating as short-term  advisors were “required to work hard in difficult conditions, in addition to their 
duties at SWC (Stockholm Vatten). Twinning often means longer working hours to cope with both SWC 
(Stockholm Vatten) duties and twinning responsibilities without additional compensation” (Lariola et al., 
2000: 30).  
 
It is highly unlikely that a PPP, based on the private operator‟s commercial considerations, could have 
achieved the same developmental objectives in terms of capacity building and investment implementation so 
effectively and at such low cost. In Tallinn, Estonia, a PUP with Helsinki Water acting as supporting partner 
and similarly structured to Stockholm Vatten‟s twinning arrangements in Lithuania and Latvia was 
“considered successful in terms of service delivery, improved efficiency and financial management”. The 
PUP was then replaced by Tallinn‟s new municipal majority with a controversial privatisation. “The 
privatisation rapidly became controversial due to the financial manipulations of the foreign operator, which 
included demands for a surcharge for water drainage, price increases, extraordinary dividend payments and 
the remuneration of the supervisory council (Lobina, 2001; Hall, Lobina and de la Motte, 2003). By the end 
of 2002, the company had cut a total of 200 jobs (about 30% of the workforce) and extracted from the 
company dividends and repayments an amount equal to 93% of what they had invested two years 
previously” (Hall et al., 2005: 23-24, 32-33). The not-for-profit basis of the partnership appears to represents 
the central distinguishing feature between PUPs and PPPs. This points to the fundamental differences 
between the two approaches to water reform and suggests that PUPs should not be treated as PPPs when it 
comes to designing the rules governing the partnership.  
 
The role of trust and its implications 
“Mutual trust, respect and understanding of our (the partners‟) different working environments are basic 
features of the collaboration” according to a key protagonist of Stockholm Vatten‟s PUPs in Kaunas and 
Riga (Bjerggaard, 2006: 2). Lariola & Danielsson (1998: 21, 30) identify the utility-to-utility relationship as 
an essential feature, “increasing the credibility and impact” of the advice offered to both the supported 
partner and local authorities, especially in light of the supporting partner‟s reputation for competence. In 
Kaunas, Stockholm Vatten proved that dialogue can contribute to an institutional environment favourable to 
reform. “The investment project and the twinning arrangement was essentially imposed on a suspicious, 
reluctant municipality, characterised by frequent political changes (6 mayors in Kaunas since 1995), and 
fighting with the formidable financial problems of post-Soviet rebuilding. … Much time was spent on 
persuasion of municipality politicians to follow the contractual commitments. The bottleneck in decision 
making was not inside KWC (Kauno Vandenys), but on the political level of the municipality. The process 
of explaining the project concept to the politicians, and to make them take the required tariff and other 
important decisions for project implementation according to the project agreements has required substantial 
twinning resources”. Stockholm Vatten “influence on Kaunas politicians at critical junctures of the project 
was decisive” (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 17, 20-21). As regards Riga, “The close cooperation between 
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SWC (Stockholm Vatten) and RW (Riga Water) since 1992 has decisively influenced the transformation of 
RW into a municipal enterprise with modern governance structures (Board of Directors and Supervisory 
Board)” (Lariola et al., 2000: 28). “The SWC‟s (Stockholm Vatten‟s) Water Utility Management Advisor 
has actively participated in this process and influenced both RW‟s (Riga Water‟s) top management and 
Riga‟s municipal decision-makers in modernising the governance structure and practices” (Lariola et al., 
2000: 17). The centrality of trust to the dynamics of the partnership contributes to shedding light on the 
factors behind the success of PUPs.  
 
Time represents an important element in cementing trust between the partners and stakeholders such as local 
authorities, thus explaining the apparently long duration of the partnerships. Furthermore, Lariola & 
Danielsson (1998: 23) note that “New ideas and management approaches require ample time for digestion”. 
When considering the whole period through which the collaboration stretched, including the preparatory 
phase of the twinning arrangements and any pause between the implementation of the various modules, 
Stockholm Vatten‟s PUP in Kaunas lasted from April 1993 to the end of 1999 while that in Riga extended 
from 1992 to December 2000 (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 8-9; Lariola et al., 2000: 9-10). Indeed, a 
comprehensive review of PUPs in the water and health sectors found out that “One trend that emerged was 
that the most effective PuPs had the longest lead-in times” (Hall et al., 2005: 24). This seems to contradict 
the assumption that the perceived long time of partnership development should be seen as a limitation of 
public sector reform in water supply and sanitation (Roth, 1987). As a matter of fact, if time is commensurate 
to the strengthening of trust and respect between partners, then the duration of the PUP can be seen as 
contributing to the building of long term capacity as it was the case in Kaunas, where “the institutional and 
management changes observed at KWC (Kauno Vandenys) are permanent and sustainable. The top 
management has initiated a major physical and mental turnaround process, and is committed to its 
completion” (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 24) and Riga (Lariola et al., 2000: 28). Furthermore, the 
strengthening of trust between the supporting partner and local decision makers throughout time, in a context 
of retained local public control over operations, will in turn contribute to the consolidation of a sense of local 
“ownership” for the institutional and organisational reforms introduced. This can be seen in contrast to the 
widespread social and political rejection of PPPs in urban water supply and sanitation worldwide. The short-
termism and rigidity associated with the pursuit of commercial considerations has in fact been perceived as 
alien to the delivery of an essential service and in conflict with the achievement of developmental objectives 
such as equity (Hall, Lobina and de la Motte, 2005; Hall et al., 2005: 24). Incidentally, Lariola & Danielsson 
(1998: 5-6) recognise that twinning was the preferred choice, “intellectually appealing, and usually 
acceptable to all stakeholders”. A cautionary note is nonetheless required. Time alone cannot explain the 
success of any PUP as the suitability of the partners, and thus their selection, as well as the effectiveness of 
the accountability networks underlying the partnership are crucial factors.        
 
The importance of trust and respect between partners, as well as their public sector ethos, has implications on 
the procedures adopted for the selection of partners. Lariola & Danielsson (1998: 31) and Lariola et al. 
(2000: iv-v) recommend the introduction of competition in order to enhance the cost-effectiveness of 
twinning arrangements, for example in the form of submission of competitive bids from potential supporting 
partners. Although a qualitative assessment of the suitability of various potential supporting partners can be 
expected to benefit the developmental impact of the twinning, the idea that the choice of partners should 
mimic the competitive selection of private operators under PPPs appears to be in contradiction with the very 
nature of PUPs and potentially counterproductive. In fact, crucial factors such as the partners‟ trust, respect 
and public ethos can be measured and comparatively evaluated only with considerable difficulty and at the 
risk of inaccuracy. Furthermore, judging at the moment of the competitive procedure how trust and respect 
between partners are to evolve or deteriorate across time might be extremely problematic if not unrealistic. In 
other words, the application of PPP-style competition to  PUPs would risk to switch the focus on the 
containment of already limited costs (see section on Cost effectiveness of PUPs below) and introduce the 
limitations of contract management observed under PPPs (see section on The experience with PPPs of the 
last 15 years in developing countries: theory and practice above), while degrading vital but unquantifiable 
aspects of the partnership such as mutual trust, respect and commitment. Such considerations warrant against 
the adoption of competition as an instrument for the identification of the ideal partners in PUPs. By contrast, 
resort to the principle of intuitu personae with the choice depending on a qualitative evaluation and 
discretionary judgment by the partners themselves, with the support of the PUP‟s political sponsors and 
financiers appear to deserve more credit. Indeed, Lariola & Danielsson (1998: 28) acknowledge that “The 
twinning partners have not normally been selected by project sponsors on the basis of bidding: instead, they 
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have often been selected on the basis of earlier contacts and suitability considerations – which has its 
advantages”.  
 
Lariola et al. (2000: iv, 19) also criticise reliance on qualitative objectives under Stockholm Vatten‟s 
twinning arrangements and recommend that in the future Sida should structure a more robust contractual 
framework, whereby terms of references should include “pre-determined, measurable targets in technical, 
environmental, financial and institutional performance”. The transformation of twinning arrangements into 
management contracts is seen as a solution to enhance cost effectiveness. “In twinning arrangements, the 
partners are expected to specify the performance objectives during the twinning process. In management 
agreements these objectives are specified in advance, and the financial compensation of the private sector 
operator depends on achievement of the performance objectives. This is the way to improve the effectiveness 
of twinning arrangements, too” (Lariola et al., 2000: 30). Even this proposition appears incongruous to the 
very nature of PUPs. In fact, contrary to management contracts and other types of PPP, PUPs are not based 
on a principal-agent relationship between local authorities and an operator motivated by commercial gain, 
but on a peer relationship forged around common values and objectives, which exclude profit-seeking, 
whose merit is to encourage local commitment to sustainable change. This implies that the success of the 
partnership does not merely depend on the capability and efforts of the supporting partner but also on the 
supported partner and decision makers‟ receptiveness. In turn, this will be determined by such factors as the 
local organisational culture, institutional framework and socio-economic conditions. For example, the 
openness to western ideas was an important factor of success in both Kaunas and Riga twinning 
arrangements7.  Also, Lariola & Danielsson (1998: 15-16, 23) and Lariola et al. (2000: 24-26) note that a 
number of unexpected occurrences, including delays in the municipal decision making exacerbated by the 
transitional context and the difficulty in recruiting adequately qualified staff for the PIU, affected the 
allocation of twinning resources and timing of objective implementation in Kaunas and Riga. In other words, 
the ability of partners to stick to an agreed timetable considerably depends on a number of independent 
variables falling outside the control of the supporting partner. Measuring its performance on the basis of the 
timely implementation of too narrowly defined targets might thus prove inappropriate and conflict with the 
cooperative spirit of PUPs. In order to remedy the “ample time” required by local partners for the digestion 
of new ideas and management approaches, Lariola & Danielsson (1998: 23) suggest that “The situation 
would be somewhat different, if the foreign experts had actual management responsibility, as is the case in a 
Management Contract or in various forms of privatisation (a joint venture [with Stockholm Vatten] was 
proposed, but rejected in Kaunas)”. As a matter of fact, it remains to be seen whether the direct involvement 
of the supporting partner in the management of local operations would produce more immediate results in 
terms of investment implementation. It is more likely that the removal of the collaborative approach and the 
replacement of local managers with foreign experts would reduce the absorptive capacity of the supported 
partner and undermine its ability to internalise knowledge for the long term.    
 
Transparency and accountability 
Effectiveness in the use of twinning resources can be enhanced by resort to systematic reporting so that the 
supporting partner can be held accountable for its activities in front of the home country‟s political sponsors, 
especially if taxpayers‟ money is being committed, and the financiers supporting the partnership. In Kaunas, 
reporting on twinning activities included the submission of annual budgets and quarterly and annual reports 
(Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 14). In Riga, Sida‟s Grant Agreement requested the submission of quarterly 
progress reports, audited annual reports, quarterly twinning reports, special and completion reports (Lariola 
et al., 2000: 13). In Riga, implementation of investments and the overall development of the local public 
utility were monitored by a Project Steering Committee representing the financiers (Lariola et al., 2000: 17, 
26). Finally, the two twinning arrangements were broadly assessed by external consultants appointed by Sida 
leading to the submission of two Evaluation Reports (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 1; Lariola et al., 2000: 2). 
 
In light of the not-for-profit basis of PUPs, the relatively limited costs of such partnerships and the marginal 
scope for reducing such costs (see below section on Cost-effectiveness of PUPs), the introduction of 
transparency appears to be an optimal substitute for competition. As noted, the supporting partner enters a 
peer-to-peer relationship with the local partner, extended through dialogue to local decision makers. The 
effectiveness of PUPs in terms of local capacity building is a result of the knowledge transferred between 
partners, fostered by the not-for-profit basis of the relationship (see below section on Training and human 
resource development), mutual trust and public sector ethos. Cost-effectiveness, in the form of the timely 
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implementation of agreed objectives within the allotted budget, is then to be ensured via monitoring from 
financiers, political sponsors and other stakeholders. Under PPPs, competition is supposed to unleash private 
sector operators‟ efficiency (Lobina & Hall, 2003: 5). By contrast, the absence of a profit motive under PUPs 
suggests that the focus in selecting the supporting partner should switch to its suitability, in terms of acquired 
knowledge, including prior contacts with the supported partner, rather than on cost reduction. Transparency 
and the ensuing accountability would thus act as a safeguard against rent-seeking from individuals or 
organisations, and a complementary stimulus to engage in the partnership.     
 
Finally, transparency and accountability mechanisms of the kind introduced in Stockholm Vatten‟s twinning 
arrangements appear to strengthen trust between the involved partners and the political and financial 
sponsors, in turn reinforcing their commitment to providing support for public sector reform. This was 
exemplified by continued EBRD financial support to both Kaunas and Riga‟s municipal water operators 
even after the completion of the two twinning arrangements.       
 
Training and human resources development  
By definition, capacity building is an essential component of PUPs so that an adequate training and human 
resources development programme should be part of any such partnership. Training is regarded as an output 
of twinning agreements (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 20). However, it is also to be seen as an input activity 
aimed at strengthening long term capacity instrumental to enhancing, not only the technical and operational 
aspects of service provision, but also investment delivery and changes in governance structure and 
institutional framework. Training provided by Stockholm Vatten in Kaunas and Riga was aimed at the local 
operators‟ management and staff, as well as local decision makers, according to needs. It took place through 
workshops, on-the-job training and study tours to Stockholm Vatten and was provided by Stockholm 
Vatten‟s long term and short term experts (Lariola et al., 2000: 21, 28; Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 21). 
Training activities followed an agreed general training programme, and permanent workgroups were 
established for ad-hoc training (Bjerggaard, 2006: 8-9). In Riga, “A Personnel Training Programme for 
management and employees was started in 1998 … The Programme covers at present two level with a third 
level planned to begin in year 2000. Over 250 staff members have already passed through the first level. 
During the first half of 1999 113 staff were participating in level 2 training” (Lariola et al., 2000: 20).  
 
Training proved considerably beneficial in all areas (Bjerggaard, 2006: 9; Lariola et al., 2000: 26, 28). On 
the operational and technical side, training contributed to creating “preconditions for good management and 
competent operations” of the new Kaunas wastewater treatment plant, ensuring compliance with Helcom and 
EU standards (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 20).  
 
Training was specifically targeted at strengthening the capacity of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) 
responsible for procurement and overseeing implementation of the investment programme. Stockholm 
Vatten‟s twinning arrangements not only resulted in the successful implementation of significant investment 
programmes, but led to the establishment of long term, local capacity for tapping investment finance and 
carrying out capital investment in the future. In Kaunas, the PIU “is now competent and well staffed. Its 
initial inexperience caused significant delays in loan disbursement. The PIU is now capable of managing the 
remaining bidding and procurement processes without a resident procurement specialist from abroad. The 
PIU operation was set up and staff trained within the twinning framework” (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 20). 
Similarly, in Riga “PIU has gained much experience from SWC (Stockholm Vatten), and is now able to act 
independently in most fields. Today, there is little need for support from SWC (Stockholm Vatten)” (Lariola 
et al., 2000: 23).  
 
As regards institutional and organisational change, a complete training programme was associated to the 
Corporate Development Plan8, a comprehensive plan encompassing strategy and action to be adopted in all 
corporate areas “to transform the twinning partners into autonomous, self-financing and self-governing 
enterprises” (Bjerggaard, 2006: 4). Training was also provided to prepare representatives of local authorities 
to engage in their new responsibility as non-executive members of the Board of Kauno Vandenys. “The 
Board training in Kaunas and in Stockholm for five Board members was considered crucially important to 
give direction to the new Board” (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 21). Bjerggaard (2006: 10) recommends that 
training support in institutional and organisational development is arranged at an early stage of the project 
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for the benefit of the supported partner and local authorities to overcome the possible lack of familiarity with 
the concept of twinning.  
 
In terms of training effectiveness, twinning arrangements can rely on the public utility-to-public utility 
relationship with the supporting partner offering first-hand experience which consultants or other experts 
might hardly have (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 21). The effectiveness of training and capacity building is 
dependent upon the incentives to knowledge transfer between the partners. In this sense, in light of their not-
for-profit basis, PUPs appear to be a more advanced vehicle for knowledge transfer than PPPs. As noted (see 
above section on The experience with PPPs of the last 15 years in developing countries: theory and 
practice), private operators regard knowledge at managerial level as a private good from which depends their 
ability to extract rent. Under PPPs, knowledge transfer aimed the building of local managerial capacity is 
thus inhibited by what the private operator perceives as a risk of losing is competitive advantage towards 
public managers and undermine the rationale behind PSP. Conversely, public water operators and 
particularly so the supporting partner under not-for-profit PUPs, view their knowledge as a public good 
characterised by non-appropriability, non-excludability, non-exhaustibility and non-tradability (Lobina & 
Hall, forthcoming in Progress in Development Studies). This can explain the positive and long term impact 
produced by Stockholm Vatten‟s training activities in Kaunas and Riga.    
 
Finally, it should be noted that knowledge transfer hardly takes place exclusive in one direction, for example 
from the supporting to the local partner. More precisely, by operating in a different and difficult 
environment, staff and managers seconded from the supporting partner on a short or long term basis enjoy 
opportunities to “widen their horizons” and enrich their knowledge and experience as their established way 
of thinking is challenged (Lariola et al., 2000: 30; Bjerggaard, 2006: 9) 9.  
 
Cost effectiveness of PUPs 
Olesen et al. (2001: 26) conclude in favour of the overall cost effectiveness of the Sida-funded twinning 
programme in the Baltic region from 1996 to 2001. The observed PUPs in Kaunas and Riga appear to have 
been cost-effective in many respects, for example when considering the impact obtained in relation to the 
cost of the twinning arrangements or when comparing their cost with alternative ways of delivering the same 
programme.  
 
The total cost of the two phases of the Kaunas twinning did not exceed SEK 16.4 million (US$ 2.27 million), 
equal to approximately 2.2% of the delivered investment programme of US$ 101 million (Lariola & 
Danielsson, 1998: 3-4). The budget for phases I and II of the Riga twinning amounted to SEK 19.8 million, 
corresponding to 2.7% of the realised US$ 104.7 million investment programme (Lariola et al., 2000: 1, 9). 
Although such estimates do not consider the costs of the preliminary periods, they also overlook the 
considerable long term impact in terms of capacity building and institutional and organisational change 
(Lariola et al., 2000: 28), let alone the investment programmes carried out after the completion of the two 
twinning arrangements which these made possible.  
 
Lariola & Danielsson (1998: 22, Annex 3) observe that the cost of the second phase of the Kaunas twinning, 
after discounting the amount of the relative investment programmes and the size of the cities, was in line 
with that of 5 World Bank-funded twinning arrangements in the Baltic region. On the other hand, Lariola et 
al. (2000: 31) recommend that the number of long term advisors should be reduced from 3 to one, with more 
intensive resort to short term advisors compensating for the reduced resident team. This seems to suggest 
that, for a given level of quality in the delivery of the partnership‟s programme, there might be limited scope 
for cutting costs. 
 
The budget for the second phase of the Kaunas twinning, equal to SEK 12.3 million, favourably compared to 
estimates for the same type of work produced by two consulting companies. “One way of checking the cost 
effectiveness (of the twinning) of is to see if someone else could have done the same quality service at a 
lower cost. We therefore asked three senior consultants from two different companies (one technical 
consultant and two management consultants) to make a budget estimate for the project, based on the 
twinning agreement. Their estimates of the costs for implementing the twinning agreement varied between 
15 and 18.5 million SEK” (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 22).   
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This paper does not directly address the cost effectiveness of PUPs as compared to PPPs. However, we offer 
the following observations on factors potentially affecting cost effectiveness under different approaches to 
water reform. First, under PUPs risk management is confined to the conduction of feasibility studies as the 
whole set of performance and political risks are retained by the local public operator and local authorities. By 
contrast, risk under PPPs has to be meticulously allocated in order to safeguard the future profitability of the 
venture and that requires more substantial costs in terms of financial, legal, consulting and other transaction 
costs. It has been estimated that under private infrastructure projects transaction costs alone can reach 5% to 
10% of total project cost (Lobina & Hall, 2003: 22). Second, the not-for-profit basis of PUPs allows for the 
maximum reinvestment of the mobilised financial resources into the local system, with no profits extracted 
in the form of dividends. This contrasts with the impact on pricing deriving from private shareholders‟ 
demands in terms of remuneration and on investment implementation under PPPs. Problems frequently 
observed include resort to tactical resources to exert upwards pressure on tariffs, including the use of 
management fees to extract increasing revenues from operations, together with the recurrent reduction in the 
value of investment programmes realised under PPPs and postponement in their implementation (Lobina & 
Hall, 2003: 10-12, 22-29). 
   
Institutional and organisational development 
The two twinning arrangements in Kaunas and Riga indicate that PUPs can not only provide capacity 
building and investment but also convey institutional and organisational change. This is important, 
institutional strengthening being a developmental goal in itself. Furthermore, local protracted ability to retain 
operational capacity and maintain investment depends in turn on governance structures. According to 
Franceys (1997: 6), “Capacity building in the urban utilities has been attempted with institutional 
development programmes which have proved their worth during the lifetime of a project (or a particular 
leader) but have generally not achieved the break-through into self-sustaining growth”. Failure of capacity 
building efforts along the lines described by Franceys (1997: 6) can be prevented if, in parallel to capacity 
building, the formal and informal accountability networks surrounding the provision of public water 
operations are made effective. Lobina & Hall (forthcoming in Progress in Development Studies) identify the 
transformation of inefficient public water undertakings as a passage from feeble “geodesic” accountability 
networks to effective, highly integrated accountability networks, whereby networks are shaped by changes in 
knowledge transfer among stakeholders. The study of the dynamics of institutional reform leading to 
enhanced sustainability and the identification of what type of PUPs can support the introduction of such 
reform become thus relevant. 
 
The two cases observed suggest that institutional and organisational change associated with PUPs is a result 
of interaction among the stakeholders supporting and participating in the partnership. The supporting partner 
can be expected to play a considerable role since its experience will define to a large extent the institutional 
and organisational “model” to be adopted locally. However, financiers‟ demands can alter such “models” in 
light of their policy and objectives. In the case of Kaunas, “the idea of twinning as a tool to achieve the 
institutional strengthening objectives was chosen, because a more direct private sector participation by 
foreign companies was neither acceptable to the local and national politicians nor to the Nordic donors” 
(Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 17). In Kaunas and Riga, the local partner‟s corporate governance was 
restructured in line with that of Stockholm Vatten, a municipally-owned company, which underwent 
corporatisation and ring-fencing of finances in 1989 (Stenroos & Katko, 2005: 10-11; Gustafsson, 2001: 5). 
However, also the EBRD informed institutional reform via loan covenants, one of which required the 
establishment of a Regulatory Unit in Riga (Lariola et al., 2000: 17), despite Stockholm Vatten‟s view that 
this was unnecessary in light of the introduced accountability mechanisms towards the municipal 
authorities10. Largely focused on corporate governance, the reforms adopted in Kaunas and Riga appear 
inspired by “New Public Management” (NPM) theory. However, the strong relationships between the 
supporting partner and local operators and decision makers, built around mutual trust, respect and common 
values, seem to confirm the assumption that the effectiveness of NPM-style reforms is enhanced by 
concomitantly taking into account local hierarchical and social values (Davis, 2004: 54-55, 62-63, 66-67). 
Davis (2004: 63-66) shows that in the case of two public sector-community PUPs in Ahmedabad, India and 
Azad and Jammu, Pakistan direct contact between public sector employees and local communities created 
reciprocal commitment with displays of gratitude resulting in professional pride and improved service levels. 
This suggests that, irrespective of the type of PUP and the developmental context, establishing genuine 
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bonds among partners and stakeholders based on recognition of the respective roles and shared objectives, is 
instrumental to the success of the partnership. 
 
The outcome of institutional change is highly dependent on the local context (Bjerggaard, 2006: 9), so that 
the form of in-house restructuring associated with the analysed twinning arrangements is not to prove 
necessarily adequate or socially acceptable in a different environment. In certain cases, appropriate, socially 
and politically acceptable institutional and organisational change might require the extension of the 
partnership to actors representative a broader set of interests than those carried by the relevant operators, 
local authorities and financiers. As it is the case in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Hall et al., 2002), this could take 
place with a more direct engagement of other stakeholders, such as local communities and civil society 
representatives, in the monitoring and conduction of public water operations and the surrounding governance 
structures. It is thus possible to envisage the development of international public sector-community 
partnerships, a hybrid between domestic “government-community” partnerships and cross-border 
development partnerships as categorised above (see section on Public-Public Partnerships (PUPs): A 
typology and definitions), whereby the relationship between the two public water operators is enlarged to the 
respective communities and civil society representatives. This might entail the development of parallel 
partnerships between civil society and community representatives related to the supporting partner and their 
counterparts in the supported city, aimed at building local capacity within the local community. Such cross-
border public sector-community PUPs might be suitable to developing public participation mechanisms with 
the support of public water operators and their respective social partners, from such established cases as 
Porto Alegre, Brazil (Hall et al., 2002: 10-11, 19), Cordoba, Spain (Observatorio de los Servicios Públicos, 
2005: 20, 25, 47-48) and Grenoble, France (Lobina, forthcoming in Utilities Policy). In Kaunas, the twinning 
arrangement was extended beyond management and staff to include the respective trade unions (Lariola & 
Danielsson, 1998: 13). This suggests that the success of the civil societal component of any public sector-
community PUP will depend to a large extent on the establishment of a relationship of mutual recognition 
and trust between the public operator and the community representatives, as a precondition to the transfer of 
context relevant and appropriate knowledge.            
 
The role of bilateral donors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs)  
Bilateral donors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) played a central role in supporting the 
analysed twinning arrangements beyond the mere provision of grants and investment finance. Sida and the 
EBRD, in particular, oversaw and accompanied the implementation of the partnerships since their conception 
facilitating the identification of the partners and closely monitoring progress throughout. Furthermore, the 
content of the twinning arrangements was informed by Sida‟s Terms of Reference and EBRD‟s “extensive, 
detailed loan covenants (which) largely directed institutional and management development” (Lariola & 
Danielsson, 1998: 15). PUPs thus seem to derive potential benefits from the support of bilateral donors and 
multilateral agencies genuinely committed to the strengthening of public water operations and the 
development of local capacity. Conversely, donors and IFIs willing to promote the sustainable reform of 
water supply and sanitation operations might consider supporting PUPs as a viable instrument to induce 
institutional and organisational change. For example, the April 2004 Operational Guidance for World Bank 
staff state that “The Bank will work with well-performing publicly owned and -operated utilities as well as 
those that put in place a credible program to improve performance over time” (World Bank, 2004: 14). 
 
Donor and IFI conditionality can be expected to affect the outcome of supported PUPs to a considerable 
extent. The experience with EBRD loan covenants in Kaunas and Riga appears to confirm that, as it was the 
case in Porto Alegre with the loan issued by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 1961 (Lobina 
& Hall, forthcoming in Progress in Development Studies), loan conditionality can represent an element of 
positive path dependence guiding local decision making towards sustainability objectives. More precisely, 
conditionality avoiding the imposition of changes in ownership and operational control such as the 
introduction of privatisation and PPPs which carry a high risk of resulting inappropriate to the local context, 
and focusing on the adoption of good governance principles might produce a positive developmental impact. 
In-house restructuring based on efficiency-aiming measures, such as the separation of the operator‟s 
accounts from those of the municipality, the ring-fencing of its finances and the introduction of transparency 
and accountability mechanisms in corporate governance, can lay the ground for incremental change and 
further reforms. This proved to be the case in Porto Alegre, whereby sound management spurred by 
conditionality attached to the 1961 IADB loan was coupled with enhanced democratisation at the beginning 
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
15/07/2010  Page 21 of 31  
  
of the 1990s. Nonetheless, the merit of any conditionality has to be judged in light of its suitability to the 
local socio-political and economic context. The social impact of IFI conditionality on pricing policy in 
Kaunas and Riga remains to be assessed, with particular reference to the effects of the adoption of linear 
rather than stepped block tariffs, the abolition of any cross-subsidies from commercial and industrial 
consumers to households and average billing amounting to 5% of disposable household income11.         
 
Donors and IFIs can also play an important role in partnership design. Lariola & Danielsson (1998: 2, 23-24) 
compare 5 World Bank-funded twinning agreements in the Baltic region with the Kaunas and Riga PUPs and 
observe that the main differences include the smaller budgets for twinning support and investment finance in 
World Bank-sponsored schemes, together with stronger focus on monitoring. All such features have 
implications on the cost effectiveness of PUPs. Although Lariola & Danielsson (1998: 23) note that the 
relative budgets were overall proportionate to the size of cities and investment projects, “The bigger budgets 
in Kaunas and Riga have allowed a continuous presence of several foreign experts, which has not been 
possible in the World Bank projects”. It is possible to assume that trying to enhance the cost effectiveness of 
PUPs by reducing the budget for twinning support might prove counterproductive as this will reduce 
exposure to the supporting partner‟s knowledge and expertise. In other words, it is highly likely that for a 
given degree of partner suitability and a given level of partnership quality a reduction in manpower resources 
devoted to the partnership will not translate into improved cost effectiveness of the PUP. In turn, this implies 
that in order to achieve a given desired objective in terms of capacity building, investment implementation 
and/or support to institutional change a minimum amount of twinning resources will be required, whose 
identification will be crucial to the partnership success.        
 
The features of PUPs in transition and developing countries: a typology 
In light of the above, we offer the following analytical framework to identify the essential features of the 
reviewed PUPs so that these can be compared to those of PPPs or other partnerships, including other types of 
PUPs, allowing for an evaluation of competing approaches to the reform of urban water systems and their 
implications. The characteristics of the reviewed PUPs are qualified from the perspective of the external or 
supporting partner, in this case Stockholm Vatten.  
 
Table 2. Partnership features of PUPs in transition and developing countries (from the perspective of 
the supporting partner)  
Feature of partnership Description 
Primary objective Contribution to development, in light of mandate from political leaders of supporting partner‟s home 
country and partnership financiers 
Main incentive Public sector ethos: pride in public sector‟s mission and sharing of own capability 
Relationship with local 
partner 
- Peer relationship public utility-to-public utility based on trust and mutual understanding 
- Advisory role to local decision makers, possibly facilitated by local partner  
Risk management No performance or political risk is assumed by the foreign partner as the local partner remains fully in 
charge of operations. This implies that the effectiveness of risk mitigation depends on the institutional 
and organisational reforms introduced in parallel to the partnership 
Institutional change - Possibility of institutional and organisational change if the PUP is extended beyond mere transfer of 
technical know-how 
- If institutional and organisational change is part of PUP, this takes place in parallel with capacity 
building and investment programme  
- Institutional and organisational reforms introduced tend to depend on supporting partner‟s 
experience and financiers‟ policy 
- Gradual approach depending on supporting partner‟s persuasion ability and receptiveness of local 
partner and decision makers 
- Community involvement and public participation depend on partnership design, as in the case of 
public sector-community PUPs, and local institutional context. When this happens, commitment to 
the partnership and success thereof may be strengthened   
Capacity building and 
knowledge transfer 
- Resources devoted to building local managerial capacity according to need and partnership design 
(thus influenced by political mandate and financiers‟ policy) 
- Resources devoted to training of local workforce according to need and partnership design (thus 
influenced by political mandate and financiers‟ policy) 
- Possibility of extending partnership to other stakeholders (e.g. trade unions-to-trade unions 
relationship) according to institutional and organisational component of PUP 
- Absence of commercial objectives means that all resources can be devoted to capacity building and 
strengthening of local governance  
- Knowledge as a public good implies incentive for maximum knowledge transfer to local partner and 
associated stakeholders (Lobina & Hall, forthcoming in Progress in Development Studies) 
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Accountability Accountability to political “owners” and financiers, strengthened by reporting on PUP‟s activities. 
Accountability to local authorities is replaced by collaborative approach. Conflict resolution is based 
on persuasion and informal amicable means 
 
The UN initiative on Water Operator Partnerships (WOPs) and practicality of PUPs 
The United Nations Secretary General Advisory Board on water (UNSGAB) is launching a scheme which 
was originally aimed at, and is still functional to, providing a global mechanism for the promotion of PUPs 
in water supply and sanitation. Such mechanism could help overcome the fragmentation that often 
characterises PUP initiatives worldwide and facilitate scaling up of the most successful experiences 
(Miranda, 2006: 54-55, 59).   
 
“During the 4th World Water Forum (Mexico, 1623 March 2006), the UNSGAB announced its 
Compendium of Actions, which aims to help achieve the on water and sanitation. Amongst others, the 
Compendium of Actions proposes the creation and implementation of a global mechanism to promote Water 
Operator Partnerships (WOPs). 
The rationale behind the mechanism is simple: the greatest capacity for improving public water and 
sanitation operators is within the operators themselves. Given that most water operators are local or 
municipal; given that even modest improvements in many of these operators will go a long way to meeting 
the MDGs; given that no current organisations have the capacity to reach the many thousands of water 
operators, then the best source of capacity in principle is directly from amongst the operators themselves. 
The mechanism will allow these operators to systematically communicate amongst each other and with any 
other organisations or institutions that can be of help, without having to wait for donors, IFIs or other 
organisations to establish contacts and develop projects. 
The PUPs mechanism would be managed by a team who will provide an internetbased platform which will 
allow participants to establish, of their own volition and initiative, the bases for partnerships. Operators and 
others will register on the internet site, using set information screens which will allow them to describe their 
situation. This system will use database software to create matches among the registrants according to the 
general descriptions of the problems (demands) and expertise (offers). Then, a list of possible partner(s) will 
be sent to the demander, who will be able to contact the offerer(s) for details, and will then be able to select 
the most appropriate partner(s). 
Many of the partnerships will be at a very low cost. Where there are significant costs involved, a number of 
options can be considered: 
· a fund could be created to be accessed by PUPs partners, based on a number of criteria; 
· the PUPs finance demands could be presented systematically to donors or development banks for support; 
· the more wealthy PUPs partner may be able to finance out of their own solidarity funds. The partner costs 
are to be, always, on a notforprofit basis. 
The PUPs management team should be hosted by a legitimate, credible, broadly accepted body – therefore, 
transparency and accountability are essential, also because one of the functions of the PUPs management 
team will be to facilitate access to necessary financing. The current proposal under debate in the UNSGAB is 
to house a small PUPs management team within UN Water, which will allow the necessary linkages and 
networks among other key international, regional and national actors. The PUPs should seek oversight from 
a wide range of stakeholders representing the broad spectrum of groups involved in the sector” (Miranda, 
2006: 58-59). 
 
In light of the above, it is possible to draw a number of recommendations addressing the practicality of the 
proposed UNSGAB mechanism.  
 
International cooperation and political mandate for PUPs 
The two analysed twinning arrangements were not sporadic and isolated initiatives but were part of a 
regionally coordinated and structured cooperative effort enjoying international financial and institutional 
support. International commitments contracted around HELCOM provided the momentum for political 
mobilisation to achieve an internationally shared environmental and social objective (Lariola & Danielsson, 
1998: 15). Such international commitments induced the Lithuanian central government to instruct the 
municipality of Kaunas to carry out the agreed investment programme (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 16), 
while the City of Stockholm instructed Stockholm Vatten to involve in development activities in the Baltic 
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region, which led to the preparation of policy and guidelines for international cooperation and regional 
assistance policies (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 10).  
 
It remains unclear whether the general commitments adopted by heads of state and governments with the UN 
Millennium Declaration (United Nations, 2000) and the water-related targets contained in the MDGs (e.g. 
MDG 7 – Ensure environmental sustainability) will provide the political momentum needed for catalysing 
national and municipal resources around UNSGAB‟s global mechanism on a global scale. Much will depend 
on UNSGAB‟s promotional efforts and the demonstrational effect of the first PUPs spurred by the global 
mechanism. However, there might be advantages in launching inter-governmental initiatives at an 
international or regional level aimed at identifying concrete, concerted actions relying on PUPs as an 
instrument for the achievement of developmental goals in water supply and sanitation.     
 
The initiators of PUPs and local decision making dynamics 
Decision making dynamics around the initiation of PUPs may be difficult to predict. In the relatively uniform 
context of the Baltic region, actors‟ behavioural patterns behind the initiatives leading to the adoption of 
PUPs in Kaunas and Riga were opposite. In Kaunas, it was the public water operator to take the lead in the 
launch of the twinning arrangement after contacts with Swedish consultancy K-Konsult were established in 
1989 and Kauno Vandenys representatives visited Stockholm to ascertain the type of support they could 
obtain. After K-Konsult elaborated a feasibility study, the EBRD asked directly Stockholm Vatten to become 
the twinning partner of Kauno Vandenys (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 10-11). “The investment project and 
the twinning arrangement was essentially imposed on a suspicious, reluctant municipality, characterised by 
frequent political changes (6 mayors in Kaunas since 1995)” (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 17). “The 
frequent changes in Kaunas municipal governance, not observed in the same scale in other municipalities, 
caused … friction” in the relationship between the municipality of Kaunas and Kauno Vandenys (Lariola & 
Danielsson, 1998: 16), which proved problematic for the implementation of the twinning arrangement12. By 
contrast, in Riga the local decision to enter a partnership with Stockholm Vatten originated at political level 
while Riga Water was initially reluctant to engage13. 
 
This suggests that there are advantages in making the UNSGAB mechanism flexible enough to allow for 
maximum interaction within a broader set of stakeholders from different cities, with particular reference to 
municipal governments whose involvement is vital to the success of PUPs. However, it cannot be excluded 
that initiatives could not stem from other stakeholders, such as trade unions, civil society and community 
representatives. Not only should the UNSGAB mechanism be promoted among stakeholders and the 
respective national, regional and international associations worldwide, but their free access to the mechanism 
should be fully granted so that they can provide enhanced stimulus to PUPs, including political pressure 
locally exerted from bottom-up. Stakeholders‟ involvement beyond operators might facilitate the inclusion of 
institutional and organisational development components in the programme underlying the partnership, so 
that this is not confined to technical capacity building or investment implementation. Furthermore, broader 
stakeholder involvement could facilitate public sector-community PUPs instead of strict water operator 
partnerships.              
 
The supporting partner’s capacity and administrative infrastructure in support of PUPs  
For twinning arrangements to be effective, it is important that they should be developed as well-structured, 
professional projects with clear objectives14 and adequate resources. Failing which, the risk is that the 
partnership might translate into a loose “friendship city” type of cooperation (Lariola et al., 2000: 30).   
 
The supporting partner‟s capacity, in terms of human resources to be devoted to the partnership and 
administrative organisation backing the initiative, is a crucial element for the success of PUPs. The 
supporting partner‟s human resources might include resident advisers, who should be highly qualified 
professionals according to Lariola & Danielsson (1998: 22), and short-term experts engaging with their 
counterparts in the twinning partner during exchanges. Even an internationally reputed and well organised 
public water operator as Stockholm Vatten faced some difficulty contributing adequate human resources to 
the two twinning arrangements, which were carried out simultaneously from 1995 to 1999. While the 
recruitment of suitable external experts seems to have been successful in Kaunas, the first of the two 
twinning arrangements to start (Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 18), remedial action had to be taken in Riga.  
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At least initially, the Riga resident team was entirely made up of individuals recruited from outside the 
Stockholm Vatten organisation, which proved problematic. The first Water Utility Management Advisor was 
appointed in December 1995 but left in May 1996 due to “co-operation problems” with the management of 
Riga Water. Despite long experience in international project management in the construction sector, the first 
Water Utility Management Advisor had “little experience from work with administrative and organisational 
change and development which was the major task for this position” (Lariola et al., 2000: 14). Stockholm 
Vatten decided to replace the first Riga Water Utility Management Advisor with the Advisor working with 
the Kaunas twinning programme, who had joined Stockholm Vatten in 1994. Lariola et al. (2000: 19, 28, 31) 
praise the new Riga Water Utility Management Advisor for his effectiveness in light of his knowledge of 
both twinning partners and experience in a transition environment. The impact of the other two resident 
advisors, the Project Implementation Advisor and Finance Advisor, was limited due to their lack of prior 
experience in the water sector, lack of previous collaboration with Stockholm Vatten and former exposure to 
Eastern European transition (Lariola et al., 2000: 14). “This evidently was a crucial handicap, which was not 
compensated by their otherwise wide experience. … (They) couldn‟t effectively facilitate contacts between 
(Stockholm Vatten) and (Riga Water), because they didn‟t know (Stockholm Vatten‟s) organisation well 
enough” (Lariola et al., 2000: 15). Lariola et al. (2000: 30) conclude that “Sub-contracted core resources 
contradict the original twinning idea”. 
 
There seem to be advantages in encouraging supporting partners participating in the UNSGAB mechanism to 
carefully select in-house human resources to be contributed to PUPs in light of their specific competence and 
knowledge of the mother organisation. Suitability to carry out the tasks identified under partnership design 
might prove to be more important than prior experience with working in twinning arrangements or working 
in the relevant developmental context. Although the experience acquired in Kaunas by the new Water Utility 
Management Advisor “proved to be very useful in Riga”, the fact that Stockholm Vatten had “little exposure 
to technical assistance in the water utilities of central and eastern Europe” before the Kaunas and Riga 
projects did not prevent the success of the two PUPs (Lariola et al., 2000: 19; Lariola & Danielsson, 1998: 
12, 15).     
 
Depending on the objectives aimed at, partnership design might envisage different combinations of human 
resources contributed by the supporting partner in terms of resident advisors and short term experts. Heavy 
resort to resident advisors might be affected by the limited availability of “highly qualified resources for 
long-term twinning assignments”. A possible solution is to retain “one experienced in-house resident advisor 
at the target utility (very much the professional profile and scope of work of the current Water Utility 
Management Advisor). He would concentrate on high level consultations with utility management, and on 
connecting the right people in the two organisations. The resource allocations between long-term and short-
term advisers should consequently be reconsidered, depending of course on specific project requirements” 
(Lariola et al., 2000: 31). 
 
The full costing and funding of all human resources contributed by the partners appears to be an important 
element of a professionally structured PUP. “The staff members of the utilities, particularly of the Swedish 
twinning partner, should be provided incentives (financial and non-financial) for participation in the twinning 
arrangement. … They are required to work hard in difficult conditions, in addition to their duties at 
(Stockholm Vatten). Twinning often means longer working hours to cope with both (Stockholm Vatten) 
duties and twinning responsibilities without additional compensation” (Lariola et al., 2000: 30). The risk is 
that, due to excessive workload in the absence of any remuneration or incentive, the sustained commitment 
of the supporting partner‟s employees might be affected.    
 
Finally, there seem to be advantages in providing professional administrative support to the partnership, 
based at the supporting organisation. “Although the centre of activity in the twinning arrangement is very 
much in the field (Riga in this case), an efficient Home Office (HO) support is necessary for coordination, 
project administration and reporting. (Stockholm Vatten) has a small HO unit in the Operations Department. 
The frequent changes in the HO staff have affected continuity, and the HO support has not been very 
effective. This has been adversely reflected in the quality of systematic planning and reporting” (Lariola et 
al., 2000: 30). Similar considerations were expressed in relation to the Kaunas twinning (Lariola & 
Danielsson, 1998: 22), as “the home office at (Stockholm Vatten) was at the beginning rather limited in its 
scope – mainly due to lack of resources. An important principle for (Stockholm Vatten) when organising the 
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twinning at its side was that the Baltic projects should be treated as other projects at (Stockholm Vatten). 
They should be part of the ordinary structure and well integrated into the day-to-day running of operations. 
… The two twinning agreements brought a considerable strain on the organisation” (Lariola & Danielsson, 
1998: 12). The effectiveness of PUPs might thus be enhanced by supporting partners developing partnerships 
as any of their own projects, from planning to implementation and follow up, full financial coverage for the 
human resources employed in terms of resident advisors, short term experts and professional administrative 
support. 
 
Enhancing the potential for knowledge transfer 
The relative difficulties encountered by Stockholm Vatten in contributing human resources to the two 
twinning arrangements in Kaunas and Riga point to the limited capacity of Northern public water operators 
to satisfy the requirements of the MDGs on a global scale through PUPs. A possible solution might be 
represented by the simultaneous promotion of North-South partnerships, together with South-South and even 
domestic PUPs or PUPs entered into by partners from the same country. In that sense, Miranda (2006: 54) 
notes that “there is enormous advantage and potential for south-south cooperation, mostly within the same 
continent, perhaps between close cultures and within a common language”. Successful domestic PUPs can 
be observed in various continents from Latin America to Africa and Asia, and involve not only water 
operators but also trade unions and local communities.  
 
In Odi, South Africa, parastatal Rand Water Company acted as a capacity-building partner to peri-urban 
municipalities with the support of trade union SAMWU. A similar partnership has been initiated in 
Harrismith, South Africa (Hall et al., 2005: 12, 28; Hall, 2001: 30). In Indonesia, public water company 
PDAM Tirtanadi has supported other smaller utilities in Northern Sumatra through an Operational Contract 
(Reclaiming Public Water, 2006: 9). In the Philippines, the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) 
has provided support to the Water Districts operating over 480 municipalities including urban and peri-urban 
areas. The LWUA has played an important role in enhancing the technical and financial performance of the 
Water Districts as technical support agency, development bank and informal regulator (Braadbaart et al., 
1999). In Honduras, state water operator SANAA has delivered training and technical assistance to 
community-based organisations and NGOs running rural water system (Hall, 2001: 30). SANAA itself had 
undergone in-house restructuring with the support of trade unions (Lobina & Hall, 2000: 47-48). In the 
province of Buenos Aires Argentina, following a failed privatisation, water workers took over operations in 
2002 while consumers associations were represented both in the regulatory agency and the management of 
water company ABSA. In two years, water supply coverage increased from 68% to 71% while sewerage 
coverage grew from 43% to 45%. Also, over 100Km of pipes have been replaced, water pressure 
strengthened and wastewater treatment plants reactivated (Amorebieta, 2005: 149-157). In July 2006, after 
the termination of the privatised concession to AGBA, the publicly-owned, workers-operated and socially-
controlled ABSA took over operations in other 7 municipalities of the Buenos Aires province with almost 4 
million inhabitants15.  
 
The effectiveness of PUPs can also be enhanced by leveraging on the knowledge elicited from the various 
PUPs, if this was to be gathered and disseminated by the organisation hosting the UNSGAB global 
mechanism. Hall & Lobina (forthcoming in Geoforum) observe that the most far reaching innovative 
approaches to extending connections to the urban and peri-urban poor are more likely to come from local 
communities, public authorities and political activity. However, such innovations and the associated 
knowledge are likely to be transmitted to other public sector bodies only as a result of geographical 
contiguity, as shown by the case of São Paulo‟s SABESP benefiting from the experience of COBES, or 
through PUPs. Development cooperation agencies have also diffused this type of knowledge, for example in 
the case of the “condominial” sewerage systems which were initially developed in Brazil. Benefiting from its 
uniquely strategic position, the organisation hosting the UNSGAB global mechanism might launch a global 
Learning Alliance across public water operators, communities and other stakeholders aimed at gathering and 
disseminating knowledge derived from PUPs beyond the involved partners. Moriarty et al. (2005: 8) provide 
the following definition of Learning Alliance: “At its simplest a Learning Alliances is a series of linked 
platforms, existing at different institutional levels (national, district, community, etc.) and created with the 
aim of bringing together a range of stakeholders interested in innovation and the creation of new knowledge 
in an area of common interest. The stakeholders involved should have complementary capabilities which, 
when combined, will allow the new knowledge created in the innovation process to be brought to scale. 
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Some of the key capabilities required are in: implementation, regulation, policy and legislation, research and 
learning, and documentation and dissemination”. 
    
Retaining knowledge and capacity within the supported partner and surrounding institutional 
setting 
The effectiveness of PUPs depends to a considerable extent on the long term effects in terms of long term 
retainment of the transferred knowledge and built capacity within the supported partner and the surrounding 
institutional setting. Moriarty et al. (2005: 11) define knowledge as “the intrinsic ability of individuals or 
groups to carry out actions”. Franceys (1997: 6) suggests that past failure of attempts to reform public water 
operations and institutions might be explained in terms of failure to retain knowledge beyond the lifetime of 
a specific project or the involvement of a particular leader. In this sense, it is possible to identify the 
following approaches to ensuring the long term effects of PUPs, depending on whether knowledge is 
transferred within the institutional setting and thus the stakeholders participating in local decision making or 
within the target organisation, and whether knowledge is prevalently treated as a public or private good. 
 
A first approach is to use PUPs to promote context relevant and sustainable institutional change, as it might 
have been the case in Kaunas and Riga, possibly including the involvement of the local community and civil 
society. Hall et al. (2005: 24) observe that the most effective PUPs among those reviewed are those where 
the local community was engaged as a partner. This can be explained in light of enhanced knowledge 
distribution through the highly interconnected accountability networks typical of advanced participatory 
mechanisms (Lobina & Hall, forthcoming in Progress in Development Studies). Intense knowledge 
circulation among the involved stakeholders would facilitate the mutual sharing and reinforcing of principles 
informing decisions and action, thus fostering the entrenchment of locally acceptable and relevant 
knowledge.            
 
A second approach pertains to the consolidation of knowledge and capacity at an organisational rather than 
institutional level and, contrary to the first approach, is based on the concept of knowledge as a private good. 
More precisely, once transferred to the management and staff of the supported partner, knowledge would 
become a proprietary good characterised by appropriability and tradability in function of the scarcity of 
qualified human resources available through the local job market and the difficulty to replicate the transfer of 
knowledge from the supporting to the supported partner. A classical approach to retaining public sector 
management and staff following in-house restructuring and capacity enhancement is to offer competitive 
remuneration packages and incentives (Baietti et al., 2006; Mugisha and Berg, 2006: 19). Remuneration and 
incentives offered to public managers and employees holding relevant knowledge should thus reflect the 
opportunity costs of replacing them within the organisation, which might be high in developing countries. 
However, other factors are also to be taken into account. For example, an observer has noted the lower 
mobility of management in public water operators as compared to privatised companies, which might thus be 
expected to contribute to the retaining of local knowledge16.  
 
An alternative or possibly complementary approach to retaining capacity within the supported partner, is 
based on the concept of knowledge as a public good and on the assumption that knowledge is transferred for 
the benefit of the supported organisation rather than individual members of management and staff. In order 
to foster the non-appropriability characteristic of knowledge as a public good (Lobina & Hall, forthcoming in 
Progress in Development Studies), multi-level Personnel Training Programmes as developed in Riga (see 
above section on Training and human resources development) could be internalised beyond completion of a 
given PUP so that knowledge distribution can be perpetuated within the beneficiary organisation. 
Furthermore, partnerships can be retained beyond the official completion of a given PUP through lower scale 
follow up programmes. Stockholm Vatten‟s experience suggests that the extension of collaboration with 
supported partners might depend on the mutual satisfaction of partners over results achieved through the 
initial PUP (Lariola et al., 2000: 28). However, the willingness towards and feasibility of continued 
cooperation also, and crucially, depends on the availability of sustainable levels of funding17.      
 
There seem to be advantages for the organisation administering UNSGAB‟s global mechanism to encourage 
partners and their political and financial sponsors to address the maintenance of local capacity since project 
design. In doing so, an appropriate combination of context relevant solutions should be sought taking into 
consideration that the consolidation of appropriate knowledge appears to be an incremental process, not 
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necessarily exhausted with knowledge transfer through a specific programme. In other words, it is possible 
that none of the identified approaches to retaining local institutional and organisational capacity might 
represent a “silver bullet” in itself and that a combined, sustained effort might be required until knowledge is 
diffused enough within the target institution or organisation to exclude that any changes in key individuals 
might prejudice the acquired body of knowledge.        
 
Conclusions 
We offer the following sets of conclusions, respectively on the differences between the dynamics behind 
PPPs and PUPs, the potential developmental impact of PUPs and implications on their promotion and scaling 
up, and areas for further research.   
 
The dynamics of PUPs are radically different from those of PPPs, in terms of the underlying objectives and 
motivations, the basis of the partnership and the configuration of accountability networks, risk perception 
and management, the way in which institutional change is related to adoption of the partnership and in terms 
of transferring knowledge and build local capacity. The introduction of institutional and organisational 
reforms is in most cases a precondition to PPPs, while the adoption of PUPs might be instrumental to public 
sector reform depending on the instructions imparted on the partners by the political and financial sponsors. 
Institutional and organisational change associated with PPPs is systematically informed by the private 
operator‟s commercial objectives, which represents an element of rigidity and potential conflict as profit-
seeking might and often does diverge from developmental objectives. The antagonistic character of PPPs and 
the “shock therapy” approach of related policies have led to widespread social and political opposition to 
PSP on an international scale. Conversely, as a result of their not-for-profit basis and retainment of public 
ownership and management of operations, PUPs rely on a more gradual and collaborative approach to 
change which can facilitate socio-political acceptability and local commitment.      
 
The developmental potential of PUPs depends on the establishment of clear objectives for the partnership, in 
light of a political mandate from the respective governments, with the collaboration being stimulated by 
mutual trust and understanding and public sector ethos. Unfettered by any conflict of interest inherent to the 
conduction of public water operations, the principal-agent relationship between the political and financial 
sponsors of PUPs and the partners can be strengthened by introducing transparency and accountability 
requirements in terms of reporting. Discipline in the implementation phase can be further instilled through 
planning and the thorough structuring of the project. PUPs are intrinsically about capacity building, to a 
considerable extent through training, in light of the advanced ability to transfer knowledge treated as a public 
good rather than as a private, marketable asset. However, their cost-effectiveness and long-term 
developmental impact can be enhanced by incorporating investment and in-house restructuring programmes 
into partnership design. The inclusion of civil society and community representatives among the partners 
might favour the success of PUPs as local commitment is facilitated and capacity is developed for local 
governance, with highly interconnected accountability networks acting as catalysts for knowledge transfer 
and reinforcing the ability to take decisions and actions. Bilateral donors and IFIs should consider supporting 
PUPs as a viable conduct for inducing sustainable water sector reform provided their focus is on promoting 
context relevant “good governance” principles rather than changes in the ownership of public operations 
which have proved counterproductive in the past. Indeed, the effectiveness of PUPs is to be promoted by 
fostering their public-ness and enhancing their distinctive characteristics rather than relying on mechanisms, 
such as the competitive selection of partners and mimicking of commercial contracts, which risk to prejudice 
the dynamics on which the success of PUPs rests. Those findings are of particular relevance to the proposed 
global mechanism for WOPs being launched by UNSGAB. We recommend that, in order to more effectively 
promote PUPs through such mechanism, the strengthening of international cooperation and the motivation of 
local actors behind partnerships are addressed, that partnership design provides for adequate capacity and 
resources devoted to the partnership, that the developmental potential of PUPs is enhanced through 
promotion of South-South and domestic partnerships, and that retaining local capacity is ensured through the 
adoption of combined, context relevant strategies based on institutional and organisational governance.     
 
Finally, this paper highlights the need for further research in the following policy relevant areas: a) the 
institutional (political, social and organisational) determinants of success with public sector reform, with 
particular reference to the factors leading to an enabling institutional environment for effective in-house 
restructuring; b) the motivations behind the initiatives originating PUPs to facilitate their systematic 
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promotion in the future; c) the causes of past failures with PUPs and attempts at public sector reform, so that 
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Notes 
                                                     
1 This and subsequent quotes are from Baltic Sea Environment Proceedings No: 72 (March 26, 1998) HELSINKI 
COMMISSION The Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Programme: Recommendations for 
Updating and Strengthening  http://www.helcom.fi/pitf/bsep72.html - Beyond the JCP Updating 
2 Sida Evaluation 98/19 Twinning Cooperation between Kaunas water Company, Lithuania and Stockholm Water Company”  August 1998 
3 Sida Evaluation 00/7 Twinning Cooperation between Riga Water Company and Stockholm Water Company”  May 2000 
4 EBRD Press Release, “EBRD renews commitment to Riga Water in Latvia”, 20 November 2000. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is lending €39 million to the Riga Water Company to improve the municipal water and 
waste-water system. It will be the first local service utility in Latvia to receive a direct corporate loan from an international financial institution. Under a 
creative structure that could be a benchmark for other municipal borrowers, the loan is backed by an undertaking municipal of support, but not a 
financial guarantee, by the city of Riga. In addition, it is an example of the effective approach the EBRD is taking to help improve the environment in its 
countries of operations.  
"The transaction shows that self-financing municipal services in Latvia can be financed without recourse to sovereign guarantees," said Thomas Maier, 
the EBRD’s Director of Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure. "The structure is innovative, as the loan is backed by limited undertakings from the 
city of Riga. It also allows Riga Water to make additional investments suited to its cash flow. The EBRD’s unique capacity to provide a full range of 
financing products to public sector borrowers becomes increasingly important as progress is made by municipalities and in legal and regulatory 
practices in the region." 
The new EBRD loan will provide funding for the construction of sludge deposits for Riga’s waste- water treatment plant, installation of water meters in 
the city and extension of sewerage and water networks in two neighbourhoods. In addition, funds will be used for the re-financing of the existing 
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sovereign-guaranteed commitments of the company, which have been used for the upgrade of Riga’s waste-water treatment plant and sewerage 
network rehabilitation. The city of Riga will provide the EBRD with an undertaking of municipal support, including the city’s adherence to agreed tariff 
schedules and other key obligations of the municipality towards the utility. 
Uldis Bambe, Managing Director of Riga Water, noted that the waste-water element of the project will have a significant environmental benefit for the 
Baltic Sea. "Therefore the project represents a major milestone in our efforts to comply fully with EU environmental standards," he said. 
5 EBRD Press Release, “EBRD brings cleaner, safer water to Lithuania - €14.7 Bank loan supports Phase Two of the Kaunas water and waste-water 
project”, 20 July 2001. 
A €14.7 million loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to Kaunas, the second-largest city in Lithuania, will support a water 
and waste-water programme which should bring clean drinking water to the local people.  
The EBRD loan, part of a €41.3 million package, will complement an existing water and waste-water loan signed in 1995. This Phase Two loan will 
finance the removal of iron from the main water supply and will support the rehabilitation and extension of the existing water pipeline system in the 
city. The project will also finance secondary water treatment facilities at the city's waste-water plant, bringing even cleaner water to the city and its 
people.  
This is the first loan to a local service utility in Lithuania without a sovereign or municipal guarantee. Thomas Maier, Director of the Municipal and 
Environmental Infrastructure Team at the EBRD said the loan will demonstrate to other cities and banks that it is possible to finance well-run municipal 
services without such guarantees. Strengthening the municipal sector in these cities is not only important for improved living conditions, it will also 
bring the country a step closer to accession to the European Union, he added. 
The project is being co-financed by the Kaunas Water Company, and the city has submitted a funding application to the EU's Instrument for Structural 
Policies for Pre-accession (ISPA) programme. As well as helping to clean rivers around the city, the project supports the country's environmental 
agenda.  
The EBRD is also helping to raise donor funds to assist with institutional development for the Kaunas Water Company and the city of Kaunas. The EBRD 
has already committed about  
€1 billion in 40 municipal and environmental infrastructure projects across the region. 
6 Agence France Presse, “EU grants Lithuania 15.96 million euros for water purification project”, October 25, 2001. 
The European Commission has confirmed a 15.96-million-euro (14.2-million-dollar) grant to finance a water purification project in Lithuania's second-
largest city Kaunas, the city's water utility said on Thursday.  
 
Biological water purification stations to be installed by 2005 will increase the measure of purification of the Nemunas river, the biggest river in the 
country, from 70 percent to the EU-required level of 95 percent, Kauno Vandenys water utility said in a statement. The money has been allocated from 
the EU's ISPA program for supporting transport and infrastructure modernisation projects in EU candidate countries.  
 
The Lithuanian government will contribute 6.38 million euros to the project which is expected to cost 25 million dollars (28.2 million euros), and Kauno 
Vandenys has also obtained a 9.57-million-euro loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).  
7 Source: Interview with Steen Bjergaard, Director of International Projects, Stockholm Vatten AB, 21st March 2006. 
8 Source: Interview with Steen Bjergaard, Director of International Projects, Stockholm Vatten AB, 21st March 2006. 
9 Source: Interview with Steen Bjergaard, Director of International Projects, Stockholm Vatten AB, 21st March 2006. 
10 Source: Interview with Steen Bjergaard, Director of International Projects, Stockholm Vatten AB, 21st March 2006. 
11 Source: Interview with Steen Bjergaard, Director of International Projects, Stockholm Vatten AB, 21st March 2006. 
12 Source: Interview with Steen Bjergaard, Director of International Projects, Stockholm Vatten AB, 21st March 2006. 
13 Source: Interview with Steen Bjergaard, Director of International Projects, Stockholm Vatten AB, 21st March 2006. 
14 Source: Interview with Steen Bjergaard, Director of International Projects, Stockholm Vatten AB, 21st March 2006. 
Hall et al. (2005: 26) observe that “It is advisable for partners entering a PuP to have a clear statement of their own 
objectives and show an understanding of other partners‟ objectives. PuPs are most effective when all partners have an 
understanding of each other's goals and are willing to work together to reach their shared goals”. In that sense, the 
identification of the respective partners‟ objectives seem to contribute to strengthening mutual trust. 
15 Source: “Cambia el proveedor de agua en siete distritos del conurbano bonaerense; Cambia el proveedor de agua en 
siete distritos del conurbano”, La Nación (Argentina), 24th July 2006. 
16 Source: Interview with Steen Bjergaard, Director of International Projects, Stockholm Vatten AB, 21st March 2006. 
17 Source: Interview with Steen Bjergaard, Director of International Projects, Stockholm Vatten AB, 21st March 2006. 
